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Abstract
We use a two-sector neoclassical open economy model with traded and non-traded
goods to investigate the eﬀects of unanticipated and anticipated tax reforms. First, an
unanticipated tax reform produces an expansion of GDP, labor, and investment, while
an anticipated tax reform has opposite eﬀects before the implementation of the labor tax
cut. Quantitatively, if the traded sector is more capital intensive, GDP increases by 1.6
percentage points or declines by 2.8 percentage points after three years, depending on
whether the tax cut is unanticipated or anticipated. Second, we ﬁnd that GDP change
masks a wide dispersion in sectoral output responses. Importantly, in all scenarios, a
tax reform substantially raises the relative size of the non-traded sector while traded
output always drops. Allowing for the markup to depend on the number of competitors,
we ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant share of GDP change can be attributed to the competition
channel while the dispersion of sectoral output responses is ampliﬁed. Finally, the
workers only beneﬁt from the labor tax cut if the tax change is unanticipated and the
traded sector is more capital intensive.
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Tax reform continues to be a key item on the policy agenda of many industrialized countries.
From the early nineties, European tax systems were asked to achieve conﬂicting targets:
reducing the unemployment rate and achieving budget balance over the medium run. As a
consequence, several European countries have cut labor tax while consumption tax has been
raised in response to the decline in ﬁscal revenues, due to the unavailability of debt ﬁnancing.
Recently, in response to deﬁcits accumulated by the current crisis, western countries have
had to ﬁnd new revenues while trying to avoid higher labor taxes at the same time. In
view of governments’ revenue needs and low employment rates, several OECD countries
are discussing changing the tax structure, i.e. a tax reform that puts more weight on
consumption taxes but reduces labor taxes.1 Even though this kind of tax structure change
has recently gained popularity, the extent of its beneﬁcial eﬀects is debatable. Further,
Mertens and Ravn [2009] and Favero and Giavazzi [2011] ﬁnd evidence of a fall in GDP
before the implementation of a tax cut as a result of ﬁscal foresight. In this paper, we revisit
the eﬀects of unanticipated tax reforms by contrasting those of anticipated tax reforms in
a small open neoclassical economy.
One major goal in this paper is to estimate the impact of unanticipated and anticipated
tax reforms on the sectoral composition of output. Our study is motivated by recent
estimates provided by B´ en´ etrix and Lane [2010] which reveal that ﬁscal shocks have a
signiﬁcant impact on the sectoral composition of aggregate output and disproportionately
beneﬁt the non-traded sector. Furthermore, while it is currently accepted that the labor
intensive sector always beneﬁts more from the labor tax cut, our model can test such
an assertion. We draw on earlier work by Turnovsky and Sen [1995] who develop an open
economy model with a traded and a non-traded sector, but consider elastic labor supply and
imperfect competition in product markets.2 One attractive feature of a two-sector model
with tradable and non- tradable goods is to cover both the closed economy and the open
economy dimensions of contemporary industrialized countries. In particular, the empirical
evidence shows that the non-tradable content of GDP and employment is substantial, at
around two-thirds.3 From an analytical point of view, as in a closed economy model,
capital accumulation clears the home good market, see e.g., Baxter and King [1993]. In
the same way as in a small open economy, external borrowing allows households to smooth
consumption intertemporally. Additionally, a two-sector model allows us to investigate the
distribution eﬀects, i.e. the movement in the labor share, while in a one-sector model, the
1See Auerbach [2011] and IMF [2010].
2Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] use a similar framework to ours, but they analyze the eﬀects of a
permanent rise in government spending by assuming that the traded sector is more capital intensive than
the non-traded sector.











































Figure 1: Tax Rates in Six European Countries (BEL, FIN, FRA, ITA, ESP, SWE)
labor share is ﬁxed (as long as the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor equal
to one).
Since tax reforms take various forms, we consider three types of policy experiments: i)
two revenue-neutral tax reforms shifting the tax burden from labor to consumption tax and
ii) one labor tax reform shifting the composition of the tax wedge from payroll taxes (i.e.
the employer’s part of labor taxes) to wage taxes (i.e. the employee’s part of labor taxes).4
The motivation for considering such revenue-neutral tax reforms draws on the change in tax
structure in European countries over the last twenty years. Figure 1 plots changes in labor
taxes and consumption taxes over the period 1990-2007 for six European countries featuring
high labor taxes and unemployment rates in the early nineties. Figure 1 shows that the
labor tax has been lowered by about 4 percentage points and over the same period the
consumption tax has been raised substantially in response to the decline in ﬁscal revenues.
Other countries, for example Hungary in the nineties, did not change the consumption tax
but instead cut payroll taxes and raised wage taxes. Hence, we also estimate the eﬀects of
a shift from payroll taxes to progressive wage taxes as in Heijdra and Lightart [2009]. From
a theoretical point of view, focusing on the three tax reforms outlined above is analytically
convenient. More speciﬁcally, we show that changes in aggregates following a tax reform
are simply a scaled-down version of the changes after a labor tax cut associated with a fall
in lump-sum transfer.
4When studying the eﬀects of revenue-neutral tax reforms, we consider alternatively a fall in payroll taxes
or a drop in progressive wage taxes coordinated with a rise in consumption tax keeping the government
budget balanced.
2Several papers exist, taking the neoclassical and New Keynesian approaches, that an-
alyze the eﬀects of tax reforms in an open economy, see Mendoza and Tesar [1998] and
Coenen et al. [2008].5 However, most of the analyses consider unanticipated tax shifts.
Recent VAR empirical evidence documented by Mertens and Ravn [2009] shows that a tax
cut produces opposite responses in GDP, hours worked and investment during the pre-
implementation period compared to the responses after the policy implementation.6 More
speciﬁcally, evidence provided by Mertens and Ravn shows that an unanticipated tax cut
gives rise to signiﬁcant increases in output, hours worked, and investment while an an-
ticipated tax cut is associated with pre-implementation declines in these aggregates. By
contrast, the real wage increases, whether the tax cut is anticipated or not. Our results
contribute to the existing literature on tax reforms by contrasting the impact of unantici-
pated labor tax cuts with the eﬀects of announced tax labor tax reductions.7 Additionally,
whereas the previous literature estimates the impacts of tax reforms only numerically, we
consider a continuous-time framework which allows us to establish a number of analytical
results.
Our paper provides three sets of key ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd that a shift from payroll
taxes to consumption taxes produces an increase in GDP which is about half-way between
the large-scale eﬀects after a shift from progressive wage taxes to consumption taxes and the
much smaller eﬀects following a shift from payroll taxes to progressive wage taxes. Second,
the predictions of our model are broadly in line with the VAR evidence related to the eﬀects
of tax shocks. In particular, we ﬁnd that an unanticipated tax reform involving a labor
tax cut stimulates consumption, crowds in investment, increases employment and raises
GDP, in line with estimates by Mertens and Ravn [2009]. Moreover, in accordance with
the evidence from Romer and Romer [2010] for the US and Cloyne [2011] for the UK, the
open economy experiences a trade balance deﬁcit on impact as consumption of the traded
good increases while traded output falls.8 When considering an anticipated labor tax cut,
we ﬁnd that GDP, hours worked and investment decline during the pre-implementation
period, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. The reason is that agents now anticipate
that they will be richer in the future. The consequent positive wealth eﬀect induces them
5Note that the literature analyzing the eﬀects of a tax reform that shifts the tax burden from labor to
consumption commonly use a closed economy framework, see e.g. Auerbach [1996], Heer and Trede [2003],
Lehmus [2011].
6Exploiting the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks proposed by Mertens and
Ravn [2009], Favero and Giavazzi [2011] also ﬁnd that anticipated tax shocks have opposite eﬀects on GDP
in the pre-implementation and post-implementation periods.
7Yang [2005] and House and Shapiro [2006] analyze the eﬀects of anticipated tax cuts by using a neo-
classical framework. In contrast to these two studies, we consider an open economy model with tradables
and non-tradables.
8According to Romer and Romer’s [2010] estimates, an exogenous tax cut results in a trade balance
deﬁcit by driving down exports and raising imports. Cloyne [2011] ﬁnds similar results for the UK, although
the response of exports is quite muted.
3to raise consumption and lower labor supply. As a result, GDP falls initially while higher
private consumption crowds out investment expenditure. Third, numerical results reveal
that aggregate eﬀects mask a wide dispersion in sectoral output responses. Following an
unanticipated 1 percent decrease in the tax revenue (relative to GDP), we ﬁnd numerically
that GDP increases between 1.6 (1.5) percentage points after three years if the traded (non-
traded) sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded (traded) sector.9 The sectoral
decomposition of GDP growth shows that traded output declines by -1.3 (-1.5) percentage
points of initial GDP while non-traded output rises by 2.9 (3.0) percentage points. When
the tax reform is anticipated, sectoral capital intensities play a key role in driving the
response of aggregate output; speciﬁcally, GDP falls by -2.8 (-1.0) percentage points while
traded output drops by -2.4 (-6.2) and non-traded output falls (rises) by only -0.4 (5.2)
percentage points.
Moreover, we explore quantitatively the role of the competition channel in driving the
eﬀects of a tax reform. In particular, a growing amount of literature emphasizes that the
variation in the number of competitors and the consequent change in the markup provides
an important magniﬁcation mechanism, see e.g., Jaimovich and, Floetotto [2008], Wu and
Zhang [2000], Zhang [2007].10 We draw on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] in allowing for
the markup to be endogenous.11 Following an unanticipated tax reform, our numerical
results show that abstracting from the competition channel would underestimate the three
years cumulative response of GDP by 5%. When the shock is anticipated, sectoral capital
intensities and endogenous markup interact in determining the extent of the eﬀects. If the
traded sector is more capital intensive, a model with a ﬁxed markup would underestimate
(overestimate) the drop of GDP after three years by almost 15% (10%) as the rise in the
markup during the pre-implementation period triggers a recessionary (expansionary) eﬀect
on non-traded output.
Finally, when analyzing the sectoral and distribution eﬀects, we ﬁnd that our two-sector
model produces two counter-intuitive results: i) the more labor intensive sector does not
always expand following a labor tax cut, ii) and the workers do not always beneﬁt from
the labor tax cut. When the tax reform is unanticipated, non-traded output is above trend
while traded output stays below in the short run, regardless of sectoral capital intensities.
When the tax cut is anticipated, the output of the more labor intensive sector declines
9Our numerical results are close to the estimates provided by Perotti [2011] who ﬁnds that an unexpected
1 percentage point of GDP decrease in taxes leads to an increase in GDP by about 1.5 percentage points
after three years.
10For a group of 14 OECD countries and 5 industries, Wu and Zhang [2000] ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant
impact of tax rates on markups. Speciﬁcally, the authors ﬁnd that higher income tax raises the markups by
reducing the number of ﬁrms.
11Note that our model is close to Coto-Martinez and Dixon’s [2003] framework. In contrast to the authors,
we allow for the markup to be endogenous and estimate numerically the eﬀects of both unanticipated and
anticipated tax reforms.
4substantially and remains below trend. Regarding the distribution eﬀects, the workers only
beneﬁt from the labor tax cut if the tax change is unanticipated and the traded sector
is more capital intensive. When the fall in the labor tax is anticipated, the fall in hours
worked raises the capital-labor ratio which in turn drives the labor share down sharply, and
more so when the markup is endogenous, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. However,
once the tax cut is implemented, the labor share recovers immediately.
Closely related to our paper is the study by Petrucci and Phelps [2009] who use a life-
cycle two-sector setup to analyze the consequences of a labor tax cut compensated by a fall in
government spending, or a rise in capital or consumption tax. In a similar spirit, we achieve
a better understanding of the aggregate eﬀects of tax reforms by investigating sectoral eﬀects
in an open economy. In contrast to our study, they restrict their analysis to the eﬀects
of unanticipated tax cuts while we investigate the consequences of both unanticipated and
anticipated tax reforms. Additionally, we consider a traded sector alternatively more or less
capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Further, we introduce imperfect competition
in product markets, contrasting the case of a ﬁxed markup with that of an endogenous
markup. Finally, we estimate numerically the short-run and long-run eﬀects and conduct
a sensitivity analysis with respect to the anticipation horizon.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the speciﬁcation
of a two-sector open economy model with traded and non-traded goods. Sections 3 and
4 provide an analytical exploration of the short-run and long-run eﬀects of unanticipated
and anticipated tax reforms. In section 5, we report results from numerical simulations and
discuss both the aggregate and sectoral eﬀects of a tax reform, contrasting the case of an
unanticipated labor tax cut with that of an anticipated tax cut. Section 6 explores the case
of an endogenous markup and discusses the quantitative role of the competition channel.
In Section 7, we summarize our main results and present our conclusions.
2 The Framework
We consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical
households and ﬁrms that have perfect foresight and live forever.12 The country is small in
terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given world interest rate, r⋆. A
perfectly competitive sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T that can
be exported and consumed domestically. An imperfectly competitive sector produces a non-
traded good denoted by the superscript N which is devoted to physical capital accumulation
12More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided
in an Appendix which is available from the authors on request.
5and domestic consumption.13 The traded good is chosen as the numeraire.14
2.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods



















where ϕ is the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle
(0 < ϕ < 1) and φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) of this unit as
labor, while the remainder, l ≡ 1 − L, is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time,
households derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working.



















where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion for consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Factor income is derived by supplying labor L at a wage rate W, and capital K at a
rental rate RK.15 Labor is taxed at rate τH. The wage tax is levied on households’ wage
income above a certain threshold κ, which represents the personal tax allowance. Thus,
WA = W − (W − κ)τH corresponds to the after-tax wage. As long as tax allowances
are positive, the tax system is progressive which means that the average tax burden rises
with the wage rate. In addition, households accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t),
that yield net interest rate earnings of r⋆B(t). Denoting lump-sum transfers by Z, the
households’ ﬂow budget constraint can be written as:
˙ B(t) = r⋆B(t) + RK(t)K(t) + WA(t)L(t) + Z − PC (P(t))
 
1 + τC 
C(t) − P(t)I(t), (3)
where PC is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non-
traded goods P. The last two terms represent households’ expenditure which include pur-
chases of consumption goods, inclusive of a consumption tax τC, and investment expendi-
ture PI. Aggregate investment gives rise to overall capital accumulation according to the
13As stressed by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], allowing for traded capital investment would not aﬀect the
results (qualitatively). Furthermore, like Burstein et al. [2004] and Bems [2008], we ﬁnd that the non-
tradable content of investment accounts for the lion’s share of total investment expenditure (averaging to
60%).
14The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small
open economy.
15We abstract from capital income tax which is beyond the scope of this paper.
6dynamic equation
˙ K(t) = I(t) − δKK(t), (4)
where we assume that physical capital depreciates at rate δK. In the rest of this paper, the
time-argument is suppressed for the purposes of clarity.
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (3) by λ, the ﬁrst-order conditions





1 + τC 
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and the appropriate transversality conditions. In an open economy model with a represen-
tative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect access
to world capital markets, we impose β = r⋆ in order to generate an interior solution. This
standard assumption made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ,
will undergo a discrete jump when individuals receive new information and must remain
constant over time from then on, i.e. λ = ¯ λ. Finally, applying Shephard’s lemma gives
consumption in tradables CT = (1 − αC)PCC and non-tradables PCN = αCPCC, where
αC denotes the non tradable content of consumption expenditures.16
2.2 Firms
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, KT and KN, and labor, LT




Y N = H
 
KN,LN 
, which are assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties of positive
and diminishing marginal products. Both sectors face two cost components: a capital rental
cost equal to RK, and a labor cost equal to the wage rate plus the employer’s part of labor
taxes, i.e. WF ≡ W
 
1 + τF 
. The traded sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
The ﬁrst order conditions derived from proﬁt-maximization in the traded sector state that
factors are paid to their respective marginal products, i.e. FK = RK and FL = WF. As
described in more detail below, the non-traded sector contains a large number of indus-
tries and each industry comprises diﬀerentiated monopolistically competitive intermediate
ﬁrms.17
16Speciﬁcally, we have αC =
(1−ϕ)P1−φ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)P1−φ. Note that it depends negatively on the relative price P as
long as φ > 1.
17In the lines of De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf [1994], the non-traded sector is assumed to be mo-
nopolistically competitive. This assumption also relies upon observed empirical facts. According to our
estimates for a sample of fourteen OECD economies, the markups in the traded sector average 1.2 with a
7The ﬁnal non-traded output, Y N, is produced in a competitive retail sector with a con-
stant returns to scale production which aggregates a continuum of measure one of sectoral
non-traded goods.18 We denote the elasticity of substitution between any two diﬀerent sec-
toral goods by ω > 0. In each sector, there are N > 1 ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated goods
that are aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good. The elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties within a sector is denoted by ǫ > 0, and we assume that this is higher than
the elasticity of substitution across sectors, i.e. ǫ > ω (see Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]).
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each ﬁrm that produces one variety
is a price setter. Output Xi,j of ﬁrm i in sector j is produced using capital and labor, i.e.
Xi,j = H (Ki,j,Li,j). Each ﬁrm chooses capital and labor by equalizing markup-adjusted
marginal products to the marginal cost of inputs, i. e. HK/  = RK, and HL/  = WF,
where   is the markup over the marginal costs. In a symmetric equilibrium, non-traded
output is equal to Y N = NX = H
 
KN,LN 
. We assume that there is a large number
of ﬁrms within each sector, so that each single intermediate producer is small relative to
the economy. In this set up each producer in a sector faces the same price elasticity of
demand, ǫ. Hence, the producer of a variety charges a constant markup   = e
e−1, where
e is the price-elasticity of demand. Because the number of competitors is large, e is equal
to ǫ. In section 6, we relax this assumption and assume instead that a ﬁnite number of
ﬁrms operate within each sector producing non-tradable varieties.19 Whether the markup
is ﬁxed or endogenous, we assume instantaneous entry, which implies that the zero proﬁt
condition holds at each instant of time.
Denoting by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N, enables us to


























, where θT and θN represent the capital
income share in output in the traded and non-traded sectors respectively. Since inputs can
move freely between the two sectors, marginal products in the traded and the non-traded
small dispersion across countries whereas for the non-traded sector, the markups average about 1.4 with a
large dispersion across countries. Additionally, assuming that the traded sector is imperfectly competitive
would not aﬀect the results qualitatively, as long as the markup is ﬁxed. Estimates of the markups charged
by the traded sector are available on request, while estimates for the non-traded sector are reported in Table
3.
18This setup builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto’s [2008] model. Details of its derivation can be found in
the Appendix.
19As stressed by Yang and Heijdra [1993], departing from the usual assumption made by Dixit and Stiglitz
[1977] implies that the price elasticity of demand becomes an increasing function of the number of ﬁrms and

















1 − θN  
kN θN
≡ WF. (6b)
These static eﬃciency conditions mean that the sectoral marginal products of capital and
labor must equal the capital rental rate RK and the labor cost WF, respectively.
Aggregating labor and capital over the two sectors, gives us the resource constraints for
the two inputs:
LT + LN = L, KT + KN = K, (7)
where LN = NLN and KN = NKN.
2.3 Government
The ﬁnal agent in the economy is the government which ﬁnances government expenditure
on traded and non traded goods, G = GT + PGN, and lump-sum transfers to house-
holds Z by raising taxes on consumption, τCPCC, and labor,
 




WF − WA 
L, in accordance with the balanced condition:20
τCPCC +
 
WF − WA 
L = Z + GT + PGN. (8)
Since tax reforms can take various forms, we consider three types of tax restructuring.
We explore two revenue-neutral tax reforms which involve simultaneously either cutting
payroll taxes by dτF < 0 or progressive wage taxes by dτH < 0 and raising consumption
taxes by dτC > 0 so that the government budget is balanced. As long as the tax system is
progressive, i.e. κ > 0, cutting either τF or τH produces diﬀerent labor outcomes because
the payroll tax and wage tax bases are not equal.
These two revenue-neutral tax reforms cause a fall in the marginal tax wedge denoted
by τM deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the producer wage and the after-tax marginal wage
expressed as a percentage of the producer cost:
τM = 1 −
1 − τH
1 + τF . (9)
We further analyze a third type of tax restructuring which involves simultaneously cutting
payroll taxes by dτF < 0 and raising progressive wage taxes by dτH > 0 so that the
marginal tax wedge is unchanged.
2.4 Short-Run Static Solutions
System (6a)-(6b) can be solved for sector capital intensity ratios: kT = kT (P) and kN =
kN (P). Using the fact that WF ≡
 
1 − θT  
kT θT
, the wage rate depends on P and the
20Government spending on traded G
T and non traded goods PG
N are considered for calibration purposes.
9employer’s part of labor taxes τF as well, i.e. W = W
 
P,τF 
, with WP ≷ 0 and WτF < 0.
An increase in the relative price P raises or lowers W depending on whether the traded
sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. A fall in τF induces
ﬁrms to raise the wage W to equalize the labor marginal product with the labor cost.
Plugging sectoral capital-labor ratios into the resource constraints and production func-
tions leads to short-term static solutions for sectoral output: Y T = Y T (K,L,P) and
Y N = Y N (K,L,P). According to the Rybczynski theorem, a rise in K raises the output
of the sector which is more capital intensive, while a rise in L raises the output of the
sector which is more labor intensive. An increase in the relative price of non-tradables P
exerts opposite eﬀects on sectoral outputs by shifting resources away from the traded sector
towards the non-traded output.
By substituting ﬁrst W = W
 
P,τF 
, eqs. (5a)-(5b) can be solved for consumption
and labor supply as follows: C = C
 ¯ λ,P,τC 
with C¯ λ < 0, CP < 0, CτC < 0, and
L = L
 ¯ λ,P,τj 
with L¯ λ > 0, LP ≷ 0, and Lτj < 0 (with j = F,H). A rise in the shadow
value of wealth induces agents to cut their real expenditure and to supply more labor. By
raising the consumption price index, an appreciation in the relative price of non-tradables
drives down consumption. Depending on whether kT ≷ kN, a rise in P stimulates or
depresses labor supply by raising or lowering W. Reducing the labor tax τj raises the
after-tax wage WA and thereby provides an incentive to supply more labor.
2.5 Equilibrium Dynamics
The adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-state is described by a dynamic
system which comprises two equations. First, the dynamic equation for the relative price of
non-traded goods (5d) which equalizes the rates of return on domestic capital (i.e. RK/P −
δK + ˙ P/P) and foreign bonds r⋆. Second, the accumulation equation for physical capital




− CN  ¯ λ,P,τC 
− GN − δKK, (10)
with L = L
 ¯ λ,P,τj 
(with j = F,H).
Dynamic equations (5d) and (10) form a separate subsystem in P and K. Inserting
short-run static solutions, linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and











  − δK
Y N
P









 K(t) − ˜ K
P(t) − ˜ P

 (11)
The determinant of the linearized 2 × 2 matrix is unambiguously negative and the trace is
equal to r⋆.21 Hence, the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path,
21See the Appendix for further details.
10irrespective of the relative sizes of the sectoral capital-labor ratios. Denoting the negative
eigenvalue by ν1 and the positive eigenvalue by ν2, the general solutions for K and P are
K(t) − ˜ K = B1eν1t + B2eν2t, P(t) − ˜ P = ω1
2B1eν1t + ω2
2B2eν2t, (12)





is the eigenvector associated
with the eigenvalue νi (with i = 1,2).
Two features of the two-sector economy’s equilibrium dynamics deserve special atten-
tion. First, as long as the markup is ﬁxed, if kT > kN, the temporal path for the relative
price remains ﬂat for the no-arbitrage condition (5d) to be fulﬁlled. Hence, in this case,
ω1
2 = 0. If capital intensities are reversed, then ω1
2 < 0. As a consequence, the relative
price exhibits transitional dynamics; P and K move in opposite directions. Second, after
an unanticipated permanent tax cut, to ultimately approach the steady-state ( ˜ K, ˜ P) and
to satisfy the transversality condition limt→∞ P(t)K(t)e−r⋆t = 0, it is necessary to set the
arbitrary constant B2 to zero. When the tax reform is announced for time T , new infor-
mation arrives at time 0 so that agents modify their decisions. Hence, two periods have
to be considered, namely a ﬁrst period (i.e. a pre-implementation period) over which the
tax reform is expected, and a second period (i.e. an implementation period) once the tax
reform is in eﬀect. While the small country adjusts along a stable path once the tax cut
is implemented, i. e. B2 must be set to zero, the economy follows unstable paths over the
pre-implementation period. These are described by eqs. (12).
Substituting eq. (10) and eq. (8) into eq. (3), we obtain the dynamic equation for the
current account (denoted by CA ≡ ˙ B):
˙ B = r⋆B + Y T (K,L,P) − CT  ¯ λ,P,τC 
− GT, (13)
where L = L
 ¯ λ,P,τF,τH 
and the second term on the RHS, i.e. Y T−CT−GT, corresponds
to net exports. Eq. (13) states that the current account is equal to the balance of trade
denoted by NX ≡ Y T − CT − GT plus interest receipts on outstanding assets. Linearizing
(13) around the steady-state and substituting (12), the general solution for the stock of
foreign assets is given by:22
B(t) = ˜ B +
  
B0 − ˜ B
 
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
 
er⋆t + Φ1B1eν1t + Φ2B2eν2t. (14)
When implementation of the tax reform is announced at time T , we must take into account
that the open economy accumulates (or decumulates) assets (i.e. domestic capital and
foreign bonds) over the pre-implementation period. The time path for net foreign assets
is described by eq. (14) during this unstable period. As stocks of assets are modiﬁed over
22If k
T > k
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N − σL˜ L˜ k
T (ν2 + δK) ˜ Λ
io
and Φ2 = − ˜ P.
11period 1 (i.e. (0,T )), we have to take new initial conditions (i.e. BT and KT ) into account
when the tax reform is in eﬀect.23
2.6 Steady-State
We now brieﬂy describe the steady-state. Setting ˙ P = 0 into eq. (5d), we obtain equality









− δK = r⋆. (15)
This equality states that the steady-state value of the relative price of non-tradables, ˜ P,
remains unaﬀected by a tax reform (as long as   is ﬁxed).
















. A labor tax cut exerts two opposite eﬀects on ˜ L. By
producing a positive wealth eﬀect (i.e. a fall in ¯ λ), agents are induced to supply less labor
while the increased after-tax wage counteracts this inﬂuence.









¯ λ, ˜ P
 
+ ˜ I + GN, (16)
where ˜ I = δK ˜ K.
Setting ˙ B = 0 into eq. (13) leads to the market-clearing condition for the traded good:
−r⋆ ˜ B ≡ ˜ NX = Y T
 




¯ λ, ˜ P
 
− GT. (17)
where ˜ NX represents steady-state net exports.
The steady-state stock of foreign bonds ˜ B is related to the stock of physical capital
through the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint which must be imposed for the country
to remain ultimately solvent:24
˜ B − B0 = Φ1
 
˜ K − K0
 
. (18)
where Φ1 < 0 describes the eﬀect of capital accumulation on the external asset position
and K0 and B0 are the initial conditions.25
23Following an unexpected tax reform, the economy moves along a stable path; hence, the trajectory for
B(t) is obtained by invoking the transversality condition limt→∞ ¯ λB(t)e
−r⋆t = 0 which implies that the
constant B2 must be set to zero.
24Substituting ﬁrst the short-run solutions, then linearizing the dynamic equation of the internationally
traded bonds (13) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and P(t) and
ﬁnally invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal
budget constraint (18).
25Since for all parameterizations, Φ1 is always negative, we assume Φ1 < 0 from now on. Hence, capital
accumulation deteriorates the current account along the transitional path.
12Before analyzing in detail the eﬀects of a tax reform, we think it would be convenient to
build intuition by discussing the long-run eﬀects of a labor tax cut, keeping ¯ λ unchanged.
The consequent rise in the wage rate stimulates labor supply which triggers an excess
supply or excess demand in the non-traded good market depending on whether kT > kN or
kN > kT. In either case, the stock of capital must rise to clear the non-traded good market
(see eq. (16)). As the open country ﬁnances capital accumulation by running current
account deﬁcits, the economy decumulates foreign bonds (see eq. (18)) and thereby must
run a trade balance surplus in the long run (see eq. (17)).
3 Eﬀects of Unexpected Tax Reforms
In this section, we explore analytically the macroeconomic eﬀects of an unexpected tax
reform, emphasizing how a labor tax cut modiﬁes the sectoral composition of GDP and
its distribution between labor and capital.26 Below, we discuss alternatively the case of
a traded sector that is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector and the case
of a traded sector that is relatively less capital intensive. While we are able to derive
impact and steady-state eﬀects in both cases, we present analytical results only in the case
kT > kN since the case kN > kT leads to uninteresting complications. When discussing the
distribution eﬀects, we will provide analytical results in both cases, i.e. kT ≷ kN, since the
direction of the change in the labor share relies heavily on sectoral capital intensities.
3.1 Revenue-Neutral Tax Reforms
We analyze ﬁrst the long-run eﬀects of two revenue-neutral tax reforms. To avoid confusion,
we denote by the superscript
 
 j,C the eﬀects of a fall in the labor tax by dτj < 0 (j = F,H)
coordinated with a rise in the consumption tax rate by dτC   j,C which is endogenously
determined so that the government budget constraint is met. Diﬀerentiating (8) gives the
change in the consumption tax:
ˆ τC 
 j,C = −
Γj
ΓC = −










˜ WF− ˜ WA
˜ WF
   








˜ WF− ˜ WA
˜ WF
    ˆ τj > 0, (19)
where we denote by a hat the percentage deviation from initial steady-state and we set
0 < ˜ ξ ≡ σL ˜ WF ˜ L
σL ˜ WF ˜ L+σCPC ˜ C < 1, 0 < ΛF ≡ (1−τH) ˜ W
˜ WA < 1, and 0 < ΛH ≡ 1 − κ
˜ WA < 1.27 The
numerator of the RHS term of eq. (19) reﬂects the eﬀect of a labor tax cut on tax revenue
while the denominator corresponds to the eﬀect of a rise in the consumption tax. The ﬁrst
term on the RHS simply reﬂects the relative size of the tax bases while the second term
shows the change in tax bases. On the one hand, a labor (consumption) tax cut (rise) lowers
26In deriving formal solutions, without loss of generality, we assume that the rate of depreciation of
physical capital is zero. In the numerical analysis, we relax this assumption.
27Note that ˆ τ
F = dτF
1+τF and ˆ τ
H = dτH
1−τH .
13(increases) public revenue, keeping consumption and employment unchanged. On the other
hand, a labor (consumption) tax cut (rise) raises (lowers) employment and consumption,
and thereby increases (decreases) tax revenues. While analytically, the net overall eﬀect
is ambiguous, for reasonable values of σL and σC and the tax rates, we ﬁnd numerically
that Γj > 0 and ΓC > 0. Hence, following a labor tax cut (i.e. ˆ τj < 0), consumption must
increase to balance the budget.
Steady-State Eﬀects
To analyze the long-run adjustment of macroeconomics aggregates, it is convenient to
assume kT > kN.28 A tax reform involving a labor tax cut raises after-tax labor income
and thereby produces a positive wealth eﬀect. The change in the marginal utility of wealth
after a tax reform is given by:29
ˆ ¯ λ
   j,C = ˜ ξΛjˆ τj −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
ˆ τC   j,C < 0, j = F,H. (20)
where ˆ τj < 0, ˆ τC 
 j,C > 0, 0 < Λj < 1, and 0 < ˜ ξ < 1. As shown by the term on the RHS
of eq. (20), both a labor tax cut and a rise in the consumption tax lowers ¯ λ as agents raise
labor supply and cut consumption which raises private wealth in both cases. Hence, Eq.
(20) implies that the shadow value of wealth falls more after a revenue-neutral tax reform
than following a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a decline in lump-sum transfer.
Assuming that the stock of ﬁnancial wealth plus transfers is positive, the labor tax base
is smaller than the consumption tax base.30 Hence, τC must increase by less than the drop in
labor tax to balance the budget. As a result, denoting by X the macroeconomic aggregates
C,L,K,NX, the long-term eﬀect of a tax reform is simply a scaled-down version of the
long-term change in the aggregate X after a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a fall in lump-sum
transfer (denoted by
ˆ ˜ X
ˆ τj ˆ τj). Formally, we have:
ˆ ˜ X
   j,C = Φj,C
ˆ ˜ X
ˆ τj ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H, (21)








The change in labor supply is central to the propagation mechanism. As the wealth
eﬀect is smaller than the positive inﬂuence of the increased after-tax wage on hours worked,
a shift of the tax burden from labor to consumption induces agents to supply more labor:
ˆ ˜ L
 
 j,C = −Φj,CσLΛj
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H. (22)
28As will become clear when discussing numerical results, long-run eﬀects are similar both qualitatively














¯j,C. Substituting the steady-state change after a labor tax change, i.e. ∂¯ λ/∂τ
j, and the steady-state
change after a consumption tax change, i.e. ∂¯ λ/∂τ
C, gives eq. (20).
30Denoting by A ≡ B+PK the stock of ﬁnancial wealth, at the steady-state, we have: r





C¢ ˜ C. As long as r
⋆ ˜ A + Z > 0, the consumption tax base is larger than the labor tax base.
14where ˆ τj < 0, 0 < Φj,C < 1. By inducing an excess supply in the non-traded good market,
higher labor supply triggers long-run capital accumulation (see eq. (16)):
d ˜ K
 




1 − ˜ ξ
  
αC˜ kNν2 − (1 − αC)˜ kTν1
 
ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H. (23)




˜ Y N, and
diﬀerentiating gives:
ˆ ˜ Y
   j,C =
 
1 − ˜ βL
 
ˆ ˜ K
   j,C + ˜ βL
ˆ ˜ L
   j,C > 0, j = F,H, (24)
where
 
1 − ˜ βL
 
= ˜ Pr⋆ ˜ K/˜ Y and ˜ βL = ˜ WF ˜ L/˜ Y are the shares of capital and labor income in
output, respectively. Two factors inﬂuence the extent of the steady-state increase in GDP.
The higher the elasticity of labor supply σL, the more agents supply labor and accumulate
physical capital, and the larger the increase in ˜ Y . Further, the more progressive the tax
scheme is (i.e. the higher the κ) the smaller the increase in the wage rate (as ΛH is lower)
and thereby the lower the labor and output rise in the long run.
Finally, while the consumption tax must increase to balance the government budget,
τC must rise less than the labor tax cut as the consumption tax base is larger than the
labor tax base. As a result, the positive wealth eﬀect is large enough to raise steady-state
consumption.
Impact Eﬀects
How does the two-sector open economy react to a tax reform in the short run? In the
case of kT > kN, the dynamics for the relative price of non-tradables degenerate. Hence,
consumption and labor immediately jump to their new steady-state levels. Regarding in-
vestment, I must clear the non-traded good market (10). Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. time the








σC ˜ CN − ν1σL˜ L˜ kT
 
+ ν1σL˜ L˜ kT
 
ˆ τj ≷ 0, j = F,H, (25)
where ˆ τj < 0. The ﬁrst term in brackets on the RHS of eq. (25) represents the wealth
eﬀect which exerts a negative impact on investment by inducing agents to consume more
and to supply less labor. The second term in brackets corresponds to the tax cut eﬀect
which stimulates capital accumulation by raising hours worked. While the response of I is
ambiguous, as shown by eq. (25), the open economy accumulates capital in the long run.
As a consequence, investment must increase on impact. The same logic applies if kN > kT.
The investment boom deteriorates the current account as savings remain unchanged:
CA(0)
   j,C = − ˜ PI(0)
   j,C < 0, j = F,H, (26)
where CA(0) = ˙ B(0) and Φ1 < 0, and we used the fact that B(0) = B0. If kN > kT, the
current account deteriorates further for a given increase in investment since savings fall as
a result of the depreciation in P which lowers the consumption-based real interest rate.
153.2 A Labor Tax Reform
As commonly analyzed in the literature considering the macroeconomic eﬀects of a tax
reform, we have investigated revenue-neutral tax reforms. We now consider that the policy
maker wishes to alter the composition of the marginal tax wedge, but without changing
its level. We denote by the superscript
   F,H the eﬀects of a tax reform which involves
simultaneously cutting the employer’s part of labor tax and increasing the progressive wage
tax dτH > 0 so as to leave the marginal tax wedge unchanged (i. e. dτM = 0, see (9)). A
restructuring of labor tax requires a rise in the wage tax by an amount given by:
dτH 
 F,H ≡ −
1 − τH
1 + τF dτF > 0. (27)
According to (27), the progressive wage tax must be increased by a smaller amount than
the fall in τF to keep the marginal tax wedge unchanged. Intuitively, since the tax rate on
a relatively large base is reduced and the tax rate on a relatively small base is increased,
the latter must rise by a smaller proportion than the former decreases so as to leave τM
unchanged.
The steady-state change of X = C,L,K,NX following a cut in τF, coordinated with a
rise in τH by an amount given by (27), reads:
ˆ ˜ X
 
 F,H = ΦF,H
ˆ ˜ X
ˆ τF ˆ τF > 0, (28)
where ˆ τF < 0, 0 < ΦF,H ≡ κ/ ˜ W < 1. Setting κ to zero implies that such a tax reform
will produce no eﬀects after a cut in payroll taxes. Rather, as long as the labor tax
scheme is progressive, i. e. κ > 0, the labor tax reform leaving the tax wedge constant
produces an expansionary eﬀect on the macroeconomic aggregates X = C,L,K,NX. As for
revenue-neutral tax reforms, the steady-state changes in X = C,L,K,NX are scaled-down
versions of their long-term changes following a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a fall in lump-sum
transfer. The scaled-down term is equal to κ/ ˜ W and thereby depends on the degree of
progressiveness of the tax scheme. The stronger the progressiveness of the tax scheme, the
larger the increase in the after-tax wage rate and thereby the greater the beneﬁcial eﬀects
on employment and overall economic activity. The impact eﬀects which are similar to that
described for revenue-neutral strategies are not discussed further.
3.3 Sectoral and Distribution Eﬀects
We now investigate in detail the sectoral and distribution eﬀects of a tax reform. Since the
three tax reforms we have considered above produce (qualitatively) similar long-run and
short-run eﬀects, we denote from now on by
 
 j,k the eﬀects of a fall in the labor tax dτj < 0
(j = F,H) ﬁnanced by a rise in τk (k = C,H).
Steady-State Eﬀects
16A convenient way to ﬁnd the direction of steady-state changes of sectoral outputs is to
use the market clearing condition for the non-traded and the traded good. Diﬀerentiating
the market clearing conditions for both goods gives:
1
 
d˜ Y N   j,k = d ˜ CN   j,k + d˜ I
   j,k > 0, (29a)
d˜ Y T 
 j,k = d ˜ NX
 
 j,k + d ˜ CT 
 j,k > 0. (29b)
Because agents consume more and investment increases while the balance of trade improves
in the long run, both non-traded and traded outputs expand. Interestingly, sectoral outputs
are correlated in the long run as a result of the positive link between investment and the
balance of trade: the greater the investment boom, the larger the accumulated debt and
the more net exports must increase in the long run. Hence, both Y N and Y T rise by a
larger amount.31
According to the Euler Theorem, GDP is split between capital and labor returns so
that the steady-state labor share denoted by ˜ βL is:32
˜ βL =
˜ WF ˜ L
˜ WF ˜ L + ˜ RK ˜ K
=
˜ ω
˜ ω + ˜ k
(30)
where ˜ RK = ˜ Pr⋆ (since we set δK = 0 for the purposes of clarity); we denoted by ˜ ω =
˜ WF/ ˜ RK the wage-interest ratio and by ˜ k = ˜ K/˜ L the capital-labor ratio. As long as the
relative price of non-tradables ˜ P is unaﬀected by the tax shock, the wage-interest ratio ˜ ω
remains unchanged. Hence, the labor share movement is driven only by the capital-labor
ratio.
Impact Eﬀects
How do sectoral outputs react to a tax restructuring on impact? In the case kT > kN,
the relative price of non-tradables remains unchanged on impact. Because capital stock is
initially predetermined, applying the Rybczynski theorem implies that non-traded output
rises whereas traded output falls. With the reversal of capital intensities, i.e. if kN > kT, the
relative price of non-tradables appreciates. As a result, non-traded output always expands,
though increased labor moderates the rise in Y N.
To analyze the distribution eﬀects of a tax reform in the short run, we ﬁrst linearize
βL =
W(P)(1+τF)L(P)
Y (K,L) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, evaluate at time t = 0, and
31Note that a similar conclusion is reached by Mendoza and Tesar [1998] who ﬁnd that trade in world
ﬁnancial markets ampliﬁes the rise in GDP after a tax reform as the open economy must service the debt
accumulated during the transition by running a trade balance surplus in the long run.
32Note that in a one-sector model with perfectly competitive markets and linearly homogenous production
function, the share of labor income in GDP is constant. Under the same assumptions, the aggregate labor
share can be deﬁned as a sectoral value added-weighted sum of the traded and non-traded labor shares.




 j,k = ˜ βL
 




 j,C > 0, kT > kN, (31a)
dβL(0)
   j,k = ˜ βL
 
1 − ˜ βL
 
ˆ ˜ L
   j,k + ˜ Θ ˆ ˜ K
   j,k ≶ 0, kN > kT, (31b)
where ˜ Θ =
 
˜ h˜ kT









< 0. As shown by eq. (31a), a labor
tax cut unambiguously raises the labor share βL on impact if kT > kN as the capital-labor
ratio increases while the relative price P remains unaﬀected (so that WF/RK is unchanged).
By contrast, if kN > kT, the relative price of non-tradables appreciates on impact which in
turn lowers the wage-interest ratio. In this case, the direction of the labor share movement
is ambiguous, as shown in eq. (31b).
4 Eﬀects of Anticipated Tax Reforms
Until now, we have considered a permanent tax reform by assuming that the tax cut was
unexpected. As emphasized by Yang [2005], ﬁscal policy changes are ordinarily preceded
by lengthy debate, and thereby agents often anticipate a planned change several quarters
before its realization. Importantly, Mertens and Ravn [2009] and Favero and Giavazzi
[2011] ﬁnd evidence that tax cuts anticipated T periods before their implementation lead
to declines in economic activity during the pre-implementation period. In this section,
we investigate analytically the eﬀects of anticipated tax reforms (denoted by the subscript
“fut”) and assume that at time t = 0, the government announces credibly a future per-
manent tax reform for time T . Since the three tax reforms considered above give similar
results (qualitatively), we restrict ourselves to the analysis of a tax reform involving a cut
in payroll taxes by dτF < 0 at time T and a rise in the consumption tax by dτC|
F,C
fut. At
time T , there is no new information and thereby no jump in the marginal utility of wealth
at this date. The higher T , the further the implementation of the tax reform.33 For reasons
of space, we assume that kT > kN. However, where necessary, we discuss brieﬂy the case
of kN > kT.
4.1 Steady-State Eﬀects
We investigate the long-run eﬀects of an pre-announced labor tax cut. We discuss the
propagation mechanism by providing analytical expressions of steady-state eﬀects on key
economic variables, assuming that kT > kN.34
33To derive formal solutions after an anticipated future permanent tax cut, we applied the procedure
developed by Schubert and Turnovsky [2002].
34Unfortunately, in contrast to an unanticipated tax reform, both long-run and short-run changes of
macroeconomic aggregates cannot be expressed as scaled-down versions of changes after a labor tax cut
associated with a drop in lump-sum transfer. Hence, the scaled-down term Φ
j,k vanishes.
18A permanent tax reform, which is expected to occur in the future, induces an equilibrium
change of the marginal utility of wealth that is smaller than would occur after an unexpected
permanent fall in the labor tax:
ˆ ¯ λ
   F,C
fut =
 
˜ ξΛF ˆ τF −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
ˆ τC   F,C
fut
 
e−r⋆T < 0, (32)
where ˆ τC 
 F,C
fut > 0 represents the change in the consumption tax for a given anticipated labor
tax cut so as to balance the government budget. As will become clearer when discussing
the numerical results, the change in the consumption tax is roughly similar whether the
tax reform is anticipated or not. Hence, according to (32), the fall in ¯ λ is smaller after an
anticipated tax reform than after an unexpected tax cut, because expected higher income
is discounted by e−r⋆T . Hence, the farther the decrease in labor tax is expected to occur,
the smaller the decline in ¯ λ.
In the same way as after an unanticipated tax reform, hours worked increase in the long






1 − ˜ ξe−r⋆T
 
ˆ τF − σL
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
e−r⋆T ˆ τC 
 F,C
fut > 0. (33)
The wealth eﬀect is reﬂected in the two terms including the scaled-down factor e−r⋆T .
Because the wealth eﬀect is smaller, agents are induced to supply more labor in the long
run whenever the tax cut is anticipated.
Following an anticipated labor tax cut (i.e. ˆ τF < 0), the long-run change of capital
stock is the result of a wealth eﬀect and tax changes:
d ˜ K
   F,C
fut = −
 




   F,C
fut − σL˜ L˜ kT ˆ τF −
σC ˜ CN
ν1
ˆ τC   F,C
fut > 0, (34)
where ˆ ¯ λ
   F,C
fut < 0 is given by (32), ˆ τC   F,C
fut > 0. The decline in the labor tax (second term)
and the rise in the consumption tax (third term) exert a positive inﬂuence on ˜ K by raising
labor supply and reducing consumption, respectively. As reﬂected by the ﬁrst term on the
RHS of eq. (34), the wealth eﬀect exerts a negative impact on ˜ K by stimulating C and
lowering L. Since the wealth eﬀect is smaller after an anticipated tax reform, the capital
stock increases by a larger amount than if the tax reform was unanticipated.
Using the same procedure as in section 3.1, we ﬁnd analytically that GDP unambigu-
ously increases in the long run:
ˆ ˜ Y
   F,C
fut =
 
1 − ˜ βL
 
ˆ ˜ K
   F,C
fut + ˜ βL
ˆ ˜ L
   F,C
fut > 0. (35)
Since agents supply more labor and accumulate more capital when the labor tax cut is
anticipated, GDP rises by a larger amount if the tax reform is anticipated. The farther
the tax reform is implemented (i.e. the higher T ), the larger the increase in steady-state
output ˜ Y .
194.2 Impact Eﬀects
We now investigate the impact eﬀects of an anticipated permanent tax reform. We are able
to present analytical expressions only if kT > kN. At the end of this subsection, we discuss
the impact eﬀects when kN > kT. Since agents are forward-looking, they know that the
present value of disposable income and therefore of wealth is increased at time 0, while the
labor tax cut is implemented only at time T . The positive wealth eﬀect induces agents
to supply less labor on impact. This behavior modiﬁes the impact eﬀects considerably
compared to those after an unanticipated tax reform.
Case kT > kN
Because the labor tax cut will only be in eﬀect at time T , the positive wealth eﬀect






σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
  
˜ ξΛF ˆ τF −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 




e−r⋆T < 0, (36)
where ˆ τj < 0. The reason is that agents supply less labor and consume more which reduces
non-traded output (due to the Rybczynski theorem) and raises CN. Hence, investment
unambiguously declines initially.
The initial response of the current account is ambiguous and is given by:
CA(0)
   F,C
fut =
 






σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
  
˜ ξΛF ˆ τF −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
˜ Cˆ τC   F,C
fut
 
e−r⋆T ≷ 0, (37)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = − ˜ P. The labor tax cut and the rise in the consumption
tax have the same eﬀect on the current account. As reﬂected by the ﬁrst term on the
RHS of eq. (37), as agents expect they will be richer in the future, they immediately raise
consumption and lower labor. This smoothing behavior reduces savings and thereby the
current account. The second term on the RHS of eq. (37) represents the fall in investment
which exerts a positive inﬂuence on the current account.
Case kN > kT
We now assume that the non-traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded
sector. We are unable to provide useful analytical expressions but we can deduce several
important results which will be highlighted when discussing the numerical results. In the
interests of space, we restrict our attention to the major changes.
When the government pre-announces that a tax reform will be implemented in the
future, agents perfectly understand that their wealth will be higher. Hence, they are induced
to consume more and to supply less labor at time t = 0. Since kN > kT, for a given P,
non-traded output now expands on impact as labor shifts towards the more capital intensive
sector. At the same time, CN increases more than after an unanticipated tax reform, as
the consumption tax rate remains unchanged until time T . Depending on whether or not
20the rise in non-traded output exceeds the increase in consumption in non-tradables CN, the
relative price of tradables depreciates or appreciates. If P depreciates suﬃciently on impact,
investment is crowded out. Two parameters play a key role in driving the investment
response: the anticipation horizon captured by T and the elasticity of labor supply σL.
The larger the anticipation horizon (i.e. the higher T ), the smaller the wealth eﬀect, the
less Y N rises, and thereby the more likely investment is crowded out on impact. The more
responsive the labor supply, the larger the increase in non-traded output (for given P),
the stronger the depreciation in the relative price of non-tradables and thereby the more
likely investment is crowded out. Finally, because traded output falls while CT increases,
net exports unambiguously decline so that the open economy experiences a current account
deﬁcit.
4.3 Sectoral and Distribution Eﬀects
We now discuss the eﬀects of a tax reform pre-announced by the government on sectoral out-
puts and the labor share. Since long-run eﬀects are qualitatively similar to those prevailing
after an unexpected tax reform, we concentrate on the impact eﬀects.
Sectoral Output Responses
When the tax reform is anticipated, the adjustment of sectoral outputs now relies heavily
upon sectoral capital intensities. If kT > kN, applying the Rybczynski theorem, as total
hours worked decrease, the output of the sector which is more labor intensive falls (i.e.
Y N), while the output of the sector which is more capital intensive rises (i.e. Y T). If
kN > kT, as labor shifts towards the more capital intensive sector, Y N should expand
whereas Y T should decline. Yet, the relative price of non-tradables also inﬂuences the
sectoral eﬀects. As stressed previously, the relative price of non-tradables may depreciate
rather than appreciate on impact which in turn counteracts the Rybczynski eﬀect. The
larger the elasticity of labor supply, the more likely the relative price P depreciates and
thereby non-traded output declines.
Labor Share Response
If kT > kN, since the capital-labor ratio unambiguously increases while the ratio
WF/RK remains unchanged, the labor share now falls rather than increases. With the
reversal of capital intensities, the labor share also decreases as a result of the drop in the
capital-labor ratio, though the fall in βL can be moderated due to the depreciation in P.
215 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the eﬀects of tax reforms quantitatively. For this purpose we
solve the model numerically.35 Therefore, ﬁrst we discuss parameter values before turning
to the long-term and short-term consequences of tax reforms.
5.1 Benchmark Parametrization
We start by describing the calibration of consumption-side parameters that we use as a
baseline. The world interest rate which is equal to the subjective time discount rate β is
set to 1%. One period of time corresponds to a quarter. The elasticity of substitution
between traded and non-traded goods φ is set to 1.5 (see e.g. Cashin and Mc Dermott
[2003]). An additional critical parameter is ϕ which is set to 0.45 in the baseline calibration
to target a non-tradable content in total consumption expenditure (i.e. αC) of 48%, in line
with our estimates.36 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption σC is set
to 0.5 because empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggest values smaller than one.37 One
critical parameter is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply σL. In our
baseline parametrization, we set σL = 0.5, in line with evidence reported by Domeij and
Flod´ en [2006].
We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical
capital depreciates at a rate δK = 1.5% to target an investment-GDP ratio of 20%. The
shares of sectoral capital income in output take two diﬀerent values depending on whether
the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. In line with
our estimates, if kT > kN, θT and θN are set to 0.38 and 0.3, respectively.38 Alternatively,
when kN > kT, we choose θT = 0.30 and θN = 0.38. When the markup is ﬁxed, we set ǫ
to 3.8 which yields a markup of 1.36, which is close to our estimates (see Table 3). When
the markup is endogenous, keeping ǫ ﬁxed, we set the elasticity of substitution between
sectoral goods ω to 1 so that the markup is 1.36.
We set GN and GT so as to yield a non-tradable share of government spending of 90%,
and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%.39 To set τC, τF and τH, we estimated
35Technically, the assumption β = r
⋆ requires the joint determination of the transition and the steady-
state.
36Table 3 shows the non-tradable content of GDP components for fourteen OECD countries.
37Note that consumption expenditure is 60% of GDP for our baseline calibration.
38Table 3 gives the values of θ
j (j = T,N) for fourteen OECD countries. The values of θ
T and θ
N we have
chosen correspond roughly to the averages for countries with k
T > k
N. For these values, the non-tradable
content of GDP and labor are 67% and 70%, respectively. When k
N > k
T, we can use reverse but symmetric
values for θ
N so that the diﬀerence between sectoral capital-labor ratios k
T − k
N remains unchanged. For
θ
T = 0.3 and θ
N = 0.38, the non-tradable content of GDP and labor are 73% and 70%, respectively.
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in the baseline calibration. The share of government spending in non-traded output is a bit small since we
consider that the whole investment is non-traded.
22the eﬀective tax rates for fourteen OECD countries over the period from 1990 to 2004 (see
Appendix A.2). Consumption tax τC is set to 14%, the employer’s part of labor taxes τF
to 17% and the wage tax τH to 33%. Tax allowances captured by κ are set to 0.4 to obtain
a share of taxable income in the gross wage earnings (W − κ)/W of 0.8 (see Table 3).
In evaluating the eﬀects of a tax reform quantitatively, we consider a labor tax cut
which lowers the tax receipts by 1 percent of GDP. We diﬀerentiate between kT > kN and
kN > kT. If kT > kN, we consider two revenue-neutral tax reforms and a restructuring of
tax keeping the marginal tax wedge is explored.40 When kN > kT, we consider only one
revenue-neutral tax reform shifting the tax burden from payroll taxes to consumption taxes
for reasons of space.41 For kT > kN and kN > kT, considering a tax reform involving a
fall in τF coordinated with a rise in τC, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect
to the elasticity of labor supply (i.e. we set σL to 0.2 and 1) and explore the role of the
competition channel by allowing for the markup to be endogenous.
When investigating numerically the eﬀects of an anticipated tax reform, we choose an
implementation lag of six quarters but also experiment with a longer implementation lag
of ten quarters.42 For either kT > kN or kN > kT, we consider a tax reform involving a fall
in τF coordinated with a rise in τC. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to
the elasticity of labor supply and the degree of openness (i.e. we set ϕ = 0.8), and we allow
for the markup to be endogenous. We discuss below the eﬀects with ﬁxed markup while we
investigate the role of endogenous markups in section 6.
5.2 Long-Run Aggregate Eﬀects
In panel A of Table 1 we report the numerical results of an unexpected tax reform. Quan-
titatively, the long-run eﬀects are small and are not sensitive to sectoral capital intensities.
In the baseline scenario, agents raise consumption by 0.1% of GDP as a result of the pos-
itive wealth eﬀect. The increase in the after-tax wage raises steady-state labor by 0.15%.
The resulting change in non-traded output stimulates capital accumulation; ˜ K increases by
0.15%. As shown in the fourth line of Panel A, GDP rises in all scenarios, as a result of the
accumulation of inputs. As expected, the elasticity of labor supply plays a substantial role
in determining the size of the eﬀects. Raising σL from 0.2 to 1 raises GDP growth from
0.08% to 0.22%.
When comparing the size of the eﬀects of tax reforms, a ﬁrst conclusion that emerges
from the numerical results reported in Panel A of Table 1 is that the tax structure, and
thereby the type of tax reform, matter. We ﬁnd that a shift from payroll taxes to consump-
40When considering a revenue-neutral tax reform shifting payroll (wage) taxes to consumption taxes, τ
F
(τ
H) must decrease by about 1.7 (2.2) percentage points to lower the tax receipts by 1 percent of GDP.
41Results for alternative tax reforms when k
N > k
T are available from the authors.
42Mertens and Ravn [2009] ﬁnd a median for the implementation lag of tax changes of six quarters amongst
tax shocks categorized as anticipated but stress that there is some variation in the anticipation lags.
23tion taxes produces an increase in GDP which is about half-way between the large eﬀects
after a shift from progressive wage taxes to consumption taxes and the much smaller eﬀects
following a shift from payroll taxes to progressive wage taxes. Shifting the tax burden from
progressive wage taxes to consumption taxes produces the largest eﬀects.43 The reason is
that the after-tax labor income increases by an amount given by ˜ W − κ after a fall in τH
which exceeds its rise given by ˜ W 1−τH
1+τF after a drop in τF. A reform keeping the marginal
tax wedge constant produces the smallest eﬀects on L, K and thereby on GDP. The reason
is that tax progressiveness is not large enough to raise substantially the after-tax wage
which results in a small increase in labor supply.44
It is worthwhile noticing that the rise in the consumption tax τC given in Panel B of
Table 1, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the government budget, varies substan-
tially, ranging from 0.8% if labor supply is highly elastic (i.e. σL is set to 1) to 1.5% if the
progressive wage tax τH is cut rather than the payroll tax τF.
Panel A of Table 2 gives the numerical results for the long-run eﬀects of an anticipated
tax reform shifting the tax burden from payroll to consumption taxes. When announced
six quarters in advance, the tax reform produces larger aﬀects than if the tax reform was
unexpected by agents. For example, in the baseline scenario, output growth increases from
0.15% to about 0.20%. The explanation is that when the labor tax cut is anticipated,
the increased after-tax labor income is expressed in present discounted value terms so that
the wealth eﬀect is smaller. As a result, agents are induced to supply more labor which
boosts further capital accumulation and thereby GDP. Since the wealth eﬀect is lower,
consumption increases less than after an unexpected tax reform.
5.3 Long-Run Sectoral and Distribution Eﬀects
When exploring the sectoral eﬀects, in line with our theoretical predictions, numerical
results show that both traded and non-traded output expand in the long-run, whether or
not the tax reform is announced, and regardless of sectoral capital intensities. Moreover,
sectoral outputs are positively correlated. For example, as shown in the two last lines
of Panel A of Table 1, raising σL from 0.2 to 1 ampliﬁes traded and non-traded output
growth from 0.04% to 0.10% and from 0.04% and 0.11% of initial GDP, respectively, if
kT > kN. The explanation is as follows. When agents supply more labor, the open
economy accumulates more capital which in turns deteriorates further the current account
43The steady-state change of X = C,L,K,NX after a change in progressive wage taxes can be related
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24in the short run. Hence, the open economy must run a larger trade balance surplus in
the long run. The larger investment boom requires ˜ Y N to increase more while ˜ Y T must
increase further to produce a higher surplus in the balance of trade.
Interestingly, when the tax cut is anticipated, as shown in Panel A of Table 2, traded
output growth always exceeds non-traded output growth. The reason is that if the labor
tax cut is anticipated rather than being unexpected, agents accumulate more capital and
thereby decumulate further foreign assets. As a consequence, net exports and thereby ˜ Y T
must increase by a larger amount, and more so as trade openness is raised.
Regarding the distribution eﬀects, since the relative price of non-tradables remains
unchanged in the long run and because the capital-labor ratio (i.e. ˜ K/˜ L) remains almost
constant, the labor share is unaﬀected in the long run across all scenarios.45
5.4 Impact Eﬀects
We now turn to the impact eﬀects of a tax reform, contrasting the consequences after an
unanticipated labor tax cut with those following an anticipated tax cut. We take a change
of tax structure involving a shift from a payroll tax to consumption tax as our baseline
scenario. Panel C of Tables 1 and 2 shows the impact eﬀects for this situation, as well as
for a number of alternative scenarios.
Before analyzing in detail the role of sectoral reallocation and anticipation in shaping the
short-run dynamics in response to a labor tax cut, we should mention the set of empirical
evidence established by Mertens and Ravn [2009]. The authors compare the eﬀects of a
tax cut depending on whether the tax change is anticipated or not. It is found that an
exogenous unexpected labor tax cut raises output, worked hours, and investment. When
the tax change is announced, output, hours worked, and investment decline during the pre-
implementation period and expand only when the tax cut is implemented. Furthermore,
the real wage increases whether the tax cut is anticipated or not. Since we consider a fall
in labor tax, we ﬁnd it interesting to compare (qualitatively) the predictions of our model
for the behavior of these variables when kT > kN and when kN > kT. One major result
that emerges from this analysis is that the predictions of our two-sector model are broadly
in line with the evidence.
To begin with, note that with a ﬁxed markup, the dynamics for the relative price of
non-tradables degenerate if kT > kN. Hence, consumption and labor adjust instantaneously
to their new steady-state values. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, when the tax
reform is unanticipated, hours worked and thereby GDP increase by 0.15% and 0.10%,
respectively, as shown in the fourth and seventh lines of Panel C of Table 1, due to the
45Since steady-state changes of βL are almost zero in all cases, we did not report the numerical results to
economize space.
25rise in the after-tax wage. By contrast, when the tax cut is anticipated, hours worked and
aggregate output decline sharply on impact by 0.5% and 0.3% respectively, as the positive
wealth eﬀect provides an incentive to raise consumption and lower labor supply.
In the model, the initial reaction of investment depends on whether the labor tax cut is
anticipated or not. In the former case, the response of investment is ambiguous if kN > kT.
On impact, an unexpected labor tax cut boosts investment by attracting resources towards
the non-traded sector, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. As shown in the ﬁfth line of
Table 1, investment increases by about 0.4% of initial GDP in the baseline scenario. When
the tax cut is anticipated, investment is crowded out, for either kT > kN or kN > kT,
though under certain circumstances. If kT > kN, the fall in labor supply lowers the output
of the sector which is more labor intensive, i.e. Y N. Hence investment declines sharply by
1.7% of initial GDP, as displayed in the ﬁfth line of Panel C of Table 2. If kN > kT, in
line with the model’s predictions, the response of investment relies heavily on the elasticity
of labor supply and the anticipation horizon. When labor supply is responsive enough
(i.e. σL is set to 1), investment declines by 0.3% of initial GDP, as the depreciation in the
relative price of non-tradables is large enough to drive down non-traded output. When the
anticipation horizon T is raised from six to ten, investment declines further from 0.03% to
about 0.5% of initial GDP.
The response of the current account is shown in the sixth line of panel C of Tables 1
and 2. We obtain a decline of the current account when the tax reform is unanticipated,
regardless of sectoral capital intensities, as a result of the investment boom. Moreover,
savings fall if kN > kT. When the tax cut is anticipated, the open economy experiences a
current account surplus if kT > kN and a deﬁcit if sectoral capital intensities are reversed.
In both cases, agents dissave as the positive wealth eﬀect provides an incentive to consume
more. However, in the former case, the fall in investment is larger which results in a current
account surplus by 1.1% of initial GDP.
In the model, the real wage W is equal to the ratio of the marginal product of labor to
the employer’s part of labor taxes, i.e. W ≡ (1−θT)(kT)
θT
1+τF (see eq. (6b)) with kT = kT (P)
(as long as the markup is ﬁxed). Hence, the real wage increases only if the employer’s
part of labor taxes τF is lowered and/or sectoral capital intensities increase (which raise
the marginal product of labor). The initial reaction of the real wage is shown in the third
line of Panel C of Tables 1 and 2. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, the real wage
increases by about 1.5% in all scenarios, except after a shift from progressive wage taxes
to consumption taxes. In the latter case, only the after-tax wage rises. When the shock
is anticipated, the real wage remains unaﬀected if kT > kN since the dynamics for the
relative price P degenerate and hence the sectoral capital-labor ratios remain unchanged.
In contrast, if kN > kT, as the relative price of non-tradables depreciates on impact,
26the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect produces an increase in the real wage, ranging from 0.03% if
σL = 0.2 to 0.25% if σL = 1.
5.5 Transitional Adjustment
We now investigate the dynamic eﬀects of a tax reform. The transitional paths of key
variables under the baseline scenario are displayed in Figure 2. We consider a revenue-
neutral tax reform shifting the tax burden from labor (i.e. payroll taxes) to consumption.
The responses of GDP, investment and current account are expressed as a percentage of
the initial steady-state output, while labor and the relative price of non tradables (i.e. P)
are given as the percentage deviation from the initial steady state. Horizontal axes measure
quarters. We also compare the baseline scenario (solid line) to alternative scenarios. The
dashed line shows the results for an endogenous markup which will be discussed in section
6. When the tax cut is unanticipated, the dotted line gives the results for a low labor
supply elasticity (i.e. σL = 0.2), while it shows those for a longer anticipation horizon (i.e.
T = 10) when the tax cut is anticipated.
While panel C gives the response on impact, panel D displays the cumulative responses
over a six-quarter horizon. Since the empirical literature analyzing the eﬀects of tax shocks
commonly report the GDP response over a three-year horizon, Panel E of Tables 1 and 2
shows the responses of aggregate and sectoral outputs after three years.
We analyze the dynamic adjustment, contrasting the eﬀects of an unanticipated tax
reform with those when the tax cut is anticipated. We start with the adjustment of labor
which is displayed in the third line of Figure 2. When the tax reform is not announced,
if kT > kN, the temporal path for L is ﬂat while with the reversal of sectoral capital
intensities, the real wage increases along the transitional path. As the relative price of non-
tradables depreciates (after an initial appreciation), the resulting increase in the real wage
pushes up labor supply. By contrast, when the tax reform is anticipated, hours worked fall
sharply six quarters before the policy realization and decline during the pre-implementation
period if kN > kT.
The dynamics for investment are displayed in the ﬁrst line of Figure 2. As long as
the labor tax cut is unanticipated, the rise in labor supply produces an investment boom,
regardless of sectoral capital intensities. Along the transitional path, investment declines
monotonically. Note that Mertens and Ravn [2009] ﬁnd that investment increases by 10% at
peak while our model predicts a smaller response of investment (over a six-quarter horizon)
which ranges from 1.4% (if kN > kT) to 1.6% (if kT > kN) in the baseline scenario. In
line with the evidence, an anticipated tax cut gives rise to a contraction of investment,
though it recovers quickly if kN > kT. As shown in Panel D of Table 2, the cumulative
response over a six-quarter horizon of investment is negative only if kT > kN. In this case,
27the fall in hours worked produces a fall in non-traded output, due to the Rybczynski eﬀect,
while consumption increases. When kN > kT, the cumulative response is negative only
when the tax cut is anticipated ten quarters before its implementation. Only in this case is
the initial depreciation in the relative price of non-tradables large enough to moderate the
non-traded output growth (see the sixth line of Panel D of Table 2) and thereby to produce
a decumulation of physical capital.
In all cases, the current account adjustment is the mirror image of the dynamics of
investment. Following an unexpected tax reform, the open economy experiences a current
account deﬁcit which shrinks over time, as shown in the second line of Figure 2. When
the tax cut is anticipated, if kT > kN, a current account surplus shows up as investment
falls sharply, though savings decline at the same time. By contrast, if kN > kT, the open
economy experiences a large current account deﬁcit as investment recovers quickly.
The fourth line of Figure 2 depicts the dynamics for output. Following an unexpected
tax reform, GDP increases along the transitional path as a result of capital accumulation,
regardless of sectoral capital intensities. When the tax cut is anticipated, the cumulative
response of aggregate output over a six-quarter horizon summarized in the fourth line of
Panel D of Table 2 is negative, ranging from -2.5% if kT > kN to -1.8% if kN > kT, for the
baseline scenario. In the former case, the large decline in investment drives down further
GDP. When the tax cut is implemented, aggregate output rises sharply as shown in the
fourth line of Figure 2. However, GDP rises above its original level only if kN > kT at time
t = T .
Panel E of Tables 1 and 2 gives the cumulative response of GDP over a three-year
horizon. Following an unanticipated 1 percent labor tax cut (relative to GDP), we ﬁnd
numerically that GDP increases by about 1.6 (1.5) percentage points after three years if
kT > kN (kT > kN). Note that our numerical results are close to the estimates provided by
Perotti [2011] who ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point of GDP unanticipated decrease in taxes
leads to an increase in GDP by about 1.5 percentage points after three years. When the
tax reform is anticipated, sectoral capital intensities play a key role in driving the response
of aggregate output; more precisely, GDP falls by 2.8 percentage points if kT > kN and
declines by only 1 percentage point when the sectoral capital intensities are reversed. The
reason for such a discrepancy is that the crowding-out of investment is more pronounced if
kT > kN since non-traded output falls in this case.
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5.6 Short-Run Sectoral and Distribution Eﬀects
The sectoral decomposition of the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks sheds light on the propagation
mechanism in an open economy. The impact and cumulative responses (over a six-quarter
horizon) of sectoral outputs are summarized in the eight and ninth lines of panel C and
the ﬁfth and sixth lines of Panel D of Tables 1 and 2 while Panel E gives the cumulative
responses over a three-year horizon.
When the tax reform is unanticipated, traded output always falls while non-traded
output expands, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. The reason is that output must
increase to meet greater demand. Since non-tradables cannot be imported, the output of
that sector must rise, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. If kT > kN, the Rybczynski
eﬀect produces a shift of labor towards the more labor intensive sector. If the sectoral
capital intensities are reversed, the relative price of non-tradables appreciates as a result of
the excess of demand which shifts resources towards the non-traded sector. As shown in
the ﬁfth line of Figures 2, traded output increases along the transitional path and recovers
its original level only after twenty quarters. As shown in Panels C and D of Tables 1 and
2, raising σL ampliﬁes the dispersion of sectoral output responses.
When the tax reform is anticipated, sectoral capital intensities now play a key role in
driving sectoral output responses. If kT > kN, as agents supply less labor, the Rybczynski
eﬀect yields a drop in non-traded output while traded output expands. If kN > kT, the
shift of labor towards the more capital intensive sector is large enough to depreciate the
relative price of non-tradables (see the second line of Panel C of Table 2). While Y N falls
on impact under certain circumstances, its cumulative response over a six-quarter horizon
is positive, as shown in the sixth line of Panel D of Table 2. Along the transitional path,
sectoral outputs vary in opposite directions as a result of the reallocation of inputs across
sectors (see the ﬁfth line of Figure 2). When kT > kN, capital decumulation produces a
fall in traded output while non-traded output expands. Whereas sectoral outputs converge
in this conﬁguration, Y T and Y N diverge when kN > kT as a result of the appreciation in
P.
Importantly, as shown in the two last lines of Panel E of Tables 1 and 2, two striking
results emerge from the numerical analysis. First, Panel E of Table 1 shows that the GDP
response masks a large dispersion in sectoral output responses. More precisely, the sectoral
decomposition of GDP growth over a three-year horizon shows that traded output declines
29by 1.3 (1.5) percentage points of initial GDP while non-traded output rises by 2.9 (3.0) if
kT > kN (kN > kT). When considering an anticipated tax cut, the dispersion in sectoral
output responses become between two and three times larger, as shown in Panel E of Table
2. Second, we ﬁnd that the relative size of the non-traded sector increases substantially
after three years, regardless of sectoral capital intensities and whether or not the tax cut is
anticipated.
When investigating the distribution eﬀects, the numerical results given in the last line
of Panels C and D of Tables 1 and 2 show that the impact and cumulative eﬀects are
substantial only if the tax cut is anticipated. Starting with kT > kN, since the relative
price dynamics degenerate, the labor share movement is only driven by the capital-labor
ratio adjustment. For the baseline scenario, the last line of panel D of Tables 1 and 2 shows
that the labor share increases by 0.12% of GDP if the tax reform is unanticipated and falls
by 0.35% if the tax reform is anticipated six quarters before its implementation. In the
former case, K/L falls while in the latter case, the drop in worked hours pushes up the
capital-labor ratio. Interestingly, if kN > kT, the labor share always drops. An unexpected
tax reform leads to a cumulative response over a six-quarter horizon of about -0.1% across
all the scenarios, as the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect pushes up the return on capital. When
the tax cut is anticipated, the cumulative response of the labor share is more negative. Its
cumulative response varies between about -0.2% if σL = 0.2 and -0.8% if σL = 1. The
reason is that investment recovers quickly which pushes up K/L, and more so if σL is
higher.
5.7 Anticipation Horizon
We now assess brieﬂy to what extent our results depend on the assumption regarding the
anticipation horizon of the labor tax cut. To begin with, we note that Mertens and Ravn
[2009] stress that the implementation lag of the shock is an important determinant for the
transmission of tax policy measures. More precisely, the authors ﬁnd empirically that the
longer the anticipation horizon, the deeper the pre-implementation downturn and the more
muted the post-implementation expansion.
In deriving our results in the baseline scenario, we have assumed that labor tax cuts are
anticipated six quarters before their implementation. The last column of Table 2 summa-
rizes the numerical results for a longer anticipation horizon, i.e. setting T = 10. In the case
of an announced future policy, the positive wealth eﬀect is smaller, since the equilibrium
change of ¯ λ is scaled down by e−r⋆T . As a result, labor, and thereby GDP decline less on
impact, regardless of sectoral capital intensities, as shown in the fourth and seventh lines
of Panel C of Table 2. An examination of the fourth line of panel D of Table 2 shows
that the cumulative response of GDP over a six-quarter horizon is more negative as the
30anticipation horizon increases, in line with the evidence from Mertens and Ravn [2009],
only if kN > kT. The reason is that P depreciates more over a six-quarter horizon which
moderates substantially the traded output expansion (see the sixth line of Panel D of Table
2).
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of an anticipated tax reform when we vary the anticipa-
tion horizon (i.e. T ) between six and ten quarters. Regardless of the anticipation horizon,
there is always an output decline prior to implementation and an output expansion after
implementation of the labor tax cut. As stressed above, the model predicts a larger decline
of GDP over a six-quarter horizon as the anticipation horizon T increases from six to ten,
but only if kN > kT. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the rise in GDP when the tax cut is imple-
mented is smaller as T is raised, regardless of sectoral capital intensities.46 As shown in
Figure 3(a), while GDP increases at time T , aggregate output remains below its original
level over two to three quarters if kT > kN. By contrast, if kN > kT, Figure 3(b) shows
that GDP rises above its original level and then declines monotonically, regardless of the
anticipation horizon.
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6 Endogenous Markups and Sectoral Eﬀects of Tax Reforms
Several papers have stressed that the variation in the number of competitors and the con-
sequent change in the markup provide an important magniﬁcation mechanism, see e.g.
Jaimovich and, Floetotto [2008], Wu and Zhang [2000], Zhang [2007], all of whom consider
one-sector models. We therefore decided to revisit quantitatively the eﬀects of unantici-
pated and anticipated tax reforms by allowing for the markup to be endogenous. Since
the long-run eﬀects remain almost unchanged compared to those in the case of a ﬁxed
markup, we will discuss them very brieﬂy. Instead, we will concentrate on how an en-
dogenous markup modiﬁes the short-run adjustment of key variables and inﬂuences both
the sectoral composition of GDP and the movement in the labor share. To save space, we
concentrate on a revenue-neutral tax reform involving a fall in the employer’s part of labor
tax (i.e. a decrease in τF) and a rise in consumption tax (i.e. an increase in τC) so that
the government budget is balanced.
46The numerical results are not reported in the paper but are available from the authors upon request.
316.1 Extending the Model to Endogenous Markup
Following Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008], we depart from the usual practice by assuming
that the number of ﬁrms is large enough so that the strategic eﬀects can be ignored, but
not so large that the eﬀect of entry on the ﬁrm’s demand curve is minuscule. Consequently,
the price elasticity of demand faced by a single ﬁrm is no longer constant and equal to the
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, but rather a function of the number of
ﬁrms N. Taking into account that output of one variety does not aﬀect the general price
index P, but does inﬂuence the sectoral price level, in a symmetric equilibrium the resulting
price elasticity of demand is given by:47
e(N) = ǫ −
(ǫ − ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞). (38)
Assuming that ǫ > ω, the price elasticity of demand faced by any single ﬁrm is an increasing
function of the number of ﬁrms N within a sector. Henceforth, the markup   = e
e−1
decreases as the number of competitors increases.
In the interests of space, we restrict our attention to the major changes in deriving
the macroeconomic equilibrium. First, the zero-proﬁt condition in the intermediate good
sector can be solved for the number of ﬁrms, i.e. N = N (K,L,P). Bearing in mind that
  =  (N), the equalities of marginal products between sectors (i.e. eqs. (6a)-(6b)) imply
that capital-labor ratios kj (j = T,N) are aﬀected by the markup, i.e. kj = kj (P, ), and
so by the number of ﬁrms. Substituting the capital-labor ratios into θT  
kT θT−1 ≡ WF to
solve for the wage rate, and into the resource constraints (i.e. eqs. (7)) and the production





, Y T = Y T (K,P,L, ), Y N = Y N (K,P,L, ), (39)
where W  ≶ 0 depending on whether kT ≷ kN, Y T
  > 0 and Y N
  < 0. To understand this
result intuitively, i.e. the impact of markup variations, let us consider that the number
of competitors increases so that   falls. All things being equal, since the ratio P/  rises,
non-traded output Y N increases while traded output Y T falls. Additionally, if kT > kN, a
fall in the markup   raises the sectoral capital-labor ratios kj and thereby the wage rate.
The same logic applies in the case of kN > kT but W falls.
6.2 Steady-state Eﬀects
We ﬁrst discuss very brieﬂy the steady-state eﬀects when the markups are endogenous. In
the long run, the expansion of non-traded output triggers an entry of ﬁrms which lowers
the markup. A lower   leads to a long-run fall in the relative price of non-tradables P,
regardless of sectoral capital intensities, to equalize the rates of return on domestic and
47Details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.








− δK = r⋆. As shown in Panel A of Tables 1-2,
the steady-state eﬀects are similar, if not identical, to those obtained in the case of a ﬁxed
markup. The reason is that in the long run, the fall in the markup and the consequent
adjustment in the relative price P exert oﬀsetting eﬀects on all variables.
6.3 Short-Run Eﬀects
We now investigate the short-term eﬀects of a tax reform when the markup is endogenous,
focusing on the GDP response, the reaction of investment, the adjustment of the real wage,
and the movement in the labor share. Numerical results for impact and cumulative (over
a six-quarter horizon) eﬀects are summarized in panels C and D of Tables 1 and 2. Panel
E gives the cumulative responses over a three-year horizon. The baseline calibration is
identical to that described in section 5.1. The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the transitional
paths for an endogenous markup.
To begin with, we note that the dynamics for the relative price of non-tradables are
restored when kT > kN. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, P must adjust to equalize









− δK = r⋆. (40)
The markup   depends on the number of ﬁrms N which drives proﬁts down towards zero
in the non-traded sector at each instant of time. Depending on whether non-traded output
is expected to increase or decrease, the number of ﬁrms rises or declines.
When the tax reform is unanticipated, non-traded output expands which lowers the
markup, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. As producers perceive a more elastic
demand, they are induced to produce more. As the marginal products of capital and labor
increase in the non-traded sector, resources shift towards that sector. Hence, as shown in
the two last lines of Panel E of Table 1, non-traded output increases by 3.4 (3.4) percentage
points rather than 3.1 (3.3) while traded output declines by 1.6 (1.8) percentage points
rather than 1.4 (1.7) if kT > kN (kN > kT). Overall, the rise in GDP after three years is
larger when the markup is endogenous. Our numerical results show that abstracting from
the competition channel would underestimate the three-year cumulative response of GDP
by 5%.
When the shock is anticipated, sectoral capital intensities and endogenous markup in-
teract in determining the size of the eﬀects. If the traded sector is more capital intensive, a
model with a ﬁxed markup would underestimate (overestimate) the drop of GDP after three
years by almost 15% (10%) as the rise in the markup during the pre-implementation period
triggers a recessionary (expansionary) eﬀect on non-traded output if kT > kN (kN > kT).
As shown in the seventh line of Panel C of Table 2, a model with an endogenous markup
33produces a larger drop in investment after an anticipated tax reform, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities. If kT > kN, investment falls more as a result of a higher markup which
triggers a recessionary eﬀect on non-traded output. When sectoral capital intensities are
reversed, the relative price of non-tradables depreciates more (see the sixth line of Figure 2)
which lowers non-traded output, and thereby investment. While these results on impact are
in line with the evidence provided by Mertens and Ravn [2009] who ﬁnd a fall in investment
after an anticipated labor tax cut, the second line of Panel D of Table 2 shows that the
cumulative response of investment is positive if kN > kT, and more so when the markup is
endogenous.
By restoring the dynamics for the relative price P, an anticipated tax cut now produces
a change in the real wage when kT > kN. In this case, the change in the real wage is the
result of two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, the appreciation of P on impact raises
the real wage due to the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect. On the other hand, the higher markup
exerts a negative impact on W. As shown in the third line of Panel C of Table 2, the latter
eﬀect predominates so that the real wage falls by about 0.1%. As a result, the labor share
falls further. In conclusion, the competition channel cannot produce the increase in the
real wage documented by Mertens and Ravn over the pre-implementation period after a
pre-announced labor tax cut when kT > kN. We ﬁnd that the real wage increases after an
anticipated tax reform only if kN > kT.
7 Conclusion
Low rates of employment and large public deﬁcits accumulated by the current crisis re-
main a key policy concern across many industrialized countries. Policy makers have there-
fore shifted their attention away from resource-consuming public subsidies to resource-
conserving reforms of the tax structure as ways of addressing the problems of growth and
employment. While the theoretical literature analyzing the eﬀects of revenue-neutral tax
reforms emphasizes the beneﬁcial eﬀects of shifting the tax burden from labor to consump-
tion, the empirical literature analyzing the eﬀects of tax cuts ﬁnds evidence of a large decline
in GDP during the pre-implementation period as a result of the ﬁscal foresight. Our paper
revisits the macroeconomic eﬀects of tax reforms in a two-sector open economy version of
the neoclassical model, with traded and non-traded goods, by considering both unantici-
pated and anticipated tax cuts. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the eﬀects of two revenue-neutral
tax reforms that shift the tax burden from labor to consumption and a tax reform reducing
a payroll tax while increasing a progressive wage tax that keeps the marginal tax wedge
unchanged.
When considering an unanticipated tax reform, three main results emerge. First, we
ﬁnd that a shift from payroll taxes to consumption taxes produces an increase in GDP
34which is about half-way between the large eﬀects after a shift from progressive wage taxes
to consumption taxes and the much smaller eﬀects following a shift from payroll taxes to
progressive wage taxes. Second, while at an aggregate level, our conclusions conﬁrm the
ﬁndings by Mendoza and Tesar [1998], numerical results reveal that the GDP response
masks a large dispersion in sectoral output responses. In particular, we ﬁnd that traded
output falls while non-traded output expands, regardless of sectoral capital intensities, due
to the shift of resources towards the non-traded sector. Third, as captured by the movement
in the labor share, the workers reap the beneﬁts of a labor tax cut only if the traded sector
is more capital intensive.
In contrast to most papers analyzing the eﬀects of tax reforms, we investigate the impact
of anticipated tax cuts. Our model predicts that, regardless of sectoral capital intensities,
GDP, hours worked and investment decline substantially during the pre-implementation
period. Importantly, sectoral capital intensities play a major role in determining the GDP
response after three years. If the traded sector is more capital intensive, GDP falls by
about 2.8 percentage points after three years while it declines by only 1 percentage point
when sectoral capital intensities are reversed. In the former case, the shift of labor towards
the more capital intensive sector ampliﬁes the crowding out of investment and thereby the
contraction of GDP. Regarding the distribution eﬀects, after an anticipated labor tax cut,
the labor share always falls during the pre-implementation period, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities, due to the rise in the capital-labor ratio.
Besides estimating the size of the aggregate eﬀects of tax reforms, one key added value
of our work here is to shed light on the sectoral decomposition of GDP response. More
speciﬁcally, numerical results reveal that, in the baseline scenario, the relative size of the
non-traded sector increases substantially after three years, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities and whether or not the tax cut is anticipated.
As expected, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of labor supply plays a key role in determining
the magnitude of the GDP response. In contrast, raising traded openness does not alter
our ﬁndings. Moreover, when conducting a sensitivity analysis of the cumulative GDP
response over a six-quarter horizon with respect to the anticipation horizon, we ﬁnd that
the longer the anticipation horizon, the deeper the pre-implementation downturn, but only
if the non-traded sector is more capital intensive. The reason is that the real exchange rate
depreciates more as the anticipation horizon increases which results in a larger decline in
investment. Finally, allowing for the markup to be endogenous, we ﬁnd a model with ﬁxed
markup underestimates the positive GDP response after an unanticipated tax cut whereas
it underestimates (overestimates) the decline in GDP if the traded (non-traded) sector is
more capital intensive when the tax cut is pre-announced.
In conclusion, we must stress a number of caveats. When considering an endogenous
35markup, we assume that entry of ﬁrms drives the proﬁt down to zero at each instant of
time. While this assumption simpliﬁes the dynamics, we believe that considering a model
with entry and exit of ﬁrms, in the lines of Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz [2010], could enrich
the analysis. In this framework, the number of ﬁrms becomes a sluggish variable so that
the markup will be unaﬀected on impact. Hence, after an anticipated tax cut, the real wage
could rise rather than decrease as a result of the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect, when the traded
sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Additionally, we consider time
separable preferences which in turn produce a signiﬁcant increase in consumption after
an anticipated tax reform, whereas Mertens and Ravn [2009] ﬁnd that the consumption
response is quite muted in the short run. Considering habit formation in consumption
would lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution at a short-run horizon and thereby
moderate the reaction of consumption on impact. Finally, due to our assumption of perfect
labor mobility across sectors, traded and non-traded output vary in opposite directions
while evidence from Benetrix and Lane [2010] mostly predicts that sectoral outputs co-
vary. Further analysis of these issues has to be left for future research.
36Unanticipated Anticipated


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Eﬀect of Tax Reforms. Notes: variables are measured in percentage points of
output, with the exception of labor and relative price of non tradables which are scaled by
their initial steady-state values.















(σL = 0.5) (σL = 0.2) (σL = 1) (µ end.) (σL = 0.5) (σL = 0.5) (σL = 0.5) (σL = 0.2) (σL = 1) (µ end.)
A.Long-Term
Consumption, d ˜ C 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.10
Labor, d˜ L 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.16
Capital, d ˜ K 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.15
GDP, d˜ Y 0.15 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.22 0.15
Traded output, d ˜ Y T 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.07
Non traded output, d ˜ Y N 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.09
B.Tax Change
Tax change, dτ
j 0.85 0.91 0.79 0.85 1.47 0.99 0.88 0.94 0.82 0.88
C.Impact
Consumption, dC(0) 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.10
RER, dP(0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
Real wage, dW(0) 1.51 1.51 1.50 1.53 0.00 1.51 1.50 1.54 1.48 1.50
Labor, dL(0) 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.12
Investment, dI(0) 0.43 0.22 0.62 0.65 0.73 0.19 0.35 0.18 0.52 0.43
Current Account, dCA(0) -0.43 -0.22 -0.62 -0.63 -0.73 -0.19 -0.43 -0.22 -0.65 -0.51
GDP, dY (0) 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.08
Traded output, dY T(0) -0.37 -0.20 -0.54 -0.58 -0.64 -0.17 -0.38 -0.19 -0.58 -0.46
Non traded output, dY N(0) 0.47 0.25 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.21 0.46 0.24 0.67 0.54
Labor Share, dβL(0) 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
D.Cumulative Response (6 qtrs)
Real Wage 9.04 9.05 9.03 9.11 0.00 9.04 9.19 9.31 9.10 9.18
Investment, dI 1.62 0.85 2.33 2.07 2.76 0.71 1.38 0.71 2.03 1.55
Current account, dCA -1.62 -0.85 -2.33 -1.99 -2.76 -0.71 -1.68 -0.85 -2.54 -1.86
GDP, dY 0.71 0.37 1.03 0.77 1.21 0.31 0.63 0.35 0.81 0.64
Traded output, dY T -1.26 -0.66 -1.82 -1.62 -2.15 -0.56 -1.35 -0.68 -2.06 -1.52
Non traded output, dY N 1.97 1.04 2.85 2.39 3.36 0.87 1.98 1.03 2.87 2.17
Labor Share, dβL 0.12 0.06 0.86 0.16 0.20 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.13 -0.10
E.Cumulative Response (3 yrs)
GDP, dY 1.56 0.82 2.26 1.66 2.66 0.69 1.46 0.79 1.98 1.50
Traded output, dY T -1.31 -0.69 -1.89 -1.50 -2.23 -0.58 -1.49 -0.75 -2.30 -1.61
Non traded output, dY N 2.87 1.51 4.15 3.17 4.90 1.27 2.95 1.54 4.28 3.10
Notes: Eﬀects of Unanticipated Tax reforms. We consider an unexpected permanent labor tax cut by τ
j (j = F,H) which lowers tax revenues by 1 percentage
point of GDP; τ
j − τ
C: revenue-neutral tax reform involving simultaneously cutting labor tax and raising consumption tax so that the government budget is
balanced; in this case, Panel B gives the change in τ
C; τ
F − τ
H: tax restructuring involving simultaneously cutting payroll taxes and raising the wage tax so that
the marginal tax wedge is unchanged; in this case, Panel B gives the change in τ
H. Responses are scaled by initial GDP, except for initial and long-run changes
of real exchange rate, real wage, labor, and capital (percent of steady state).
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bench T = 6 low σL high σL open markup T = 10 bench T = 6 low σL high σL open markup T = 10
(σL = 0.5) (σL = 0.2) (σL = 1) (ϕ = 0.8) (µ end.) (σL = 0.5) (σL = 0.5) (σL = 0.2) (σL = 1) (ϕ = 0.8) (µ end.) (σL = 0.5)
A.Long-Term
Consumption, d ˜ C 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07
Labor, d˜ L 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.19 0.21
Capital, d ˜ K 0.20 0.10 0.32 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.19
GDP, d˜ Y 0.19 0.09 0.30 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.28 0.18 0.18 0.20
Traded output, d ˜ Y T 0.11 0.06 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.12
Non traded output, d ˜ Y N 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.08
B.Tax Change
Consumption tax, dτ
C 0.84 0.91 0.77 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.94 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.87
C.Impact
Consumption, dC(0) 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.31
RER, dP(0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Real Wage, dW(0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.11 0.03 0.25 0.13 0.12 0.15
Labor, dL(0) -0.50 -0.18 -1.07 -0.51 -0.55 -0.48 -0.47 -0.18 -0.89 -0.44 -0.46 -0.43
Investment, dI(0) -1.74 -0.72 -3.58 -1.64 -2.84 -1.67 -0.03 0.05 -0.31 -0.08 -0.16 -0.47
Current Account, dCA(0) 1.10 0.32 2.52 0.99 2.08 1.05 -0.50 -0.42 -0.44 -0.44 -0.36 -0.01
GDP, dY (0) -0.34 -0.12 -0.72 -0.34 -0.37 -0.32 -0.30 -0.12 -0.57 -0.29 -0.30 -0.27
Traded output, dY T(0) 1.26 0.46 2.70 1.26 2.24 1.21 -0.37 -0.30 -0.29 -0.19 -0.23 0.12
Non traded output, dY N(0) -1.60 -0.59 -3.42 -1.59 -2.61 -1.53 0.07 0.18 -0.28 -0.10 -0.07 -0.40
Labor Share, dβL(0) -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.20 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00
D.Cumulative Response (6 qtrs)
Real Wage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.62 0.00 0.43 0.11 0.99 0.50 0.39 0.58
Investment, dI -6.61 -2.72 -13.59 -6.22 -10.44 -6.34 2.96 1.27 5.24 2.93 3.38 -0.45
Current account, dCA 2.63 0.25 7.04 2.24 5.84 2.52 -6.50 -3.63 -10.51 -6.42 -6.95 -2.78
GDP, dY -2.48 -0.93 -5.27 -2.44 -2.89 -2.38 -1.76 -0.66 -3.57 -1.73 -1.76 -1.83
Traded output, dY T 3.52 1.11 7.90 3.74 6.65 3.37 -5.53 -2.80 -9.40 -4.79 -5.98 -1.94
Non traded output, dY N -6.00 -2.04 -13.17 -6.19 -9.54 -5.75 3.78 2.14 5.84 3.06 4.22 0.10
Labor Share, dβL -0.35 -0.11 0.17 -0.40 -0.67 -0.33 -0.46 -0.22 -0.80 -0.36 -0.49 -0.19
E.Cumulative Response (3 yrs)
GDP, dY -2.77 -0.97 -6.22 -2.68 -3.31 -4.83 -0.96 -0.27 -2.30 -0.92 -0.87 -3.00
Traded output, dY T -2.42 -1.50 -3.53 -1.82 -3.28 0.33 -6.19 -3.14 -10.43 -5.14 -6.43 -8.59
Non traded output, dY N -0.35 0.53 -2.69 -0.86 -0.03 -5.16 5.22 2.87 8.13 4.22 5.56 5.59
Notes: Eﬀects of anticipated tax reforms. We consider an anticipated permanent labor tax cut by dτ
F which lowers tax revenues by 1 percentage point of GDP; τ
F − τ
C: revenue-neutral
tax reform involving simultaneously cutting payroll taxes and raising consumption taxes so that the government budget is balanced. Impact and steady-state deviations are scaled by initial
GDP, exception with the real exchange rate, real wage, labor, and capital which are scaled by their initial steady-state values.
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Figure 3: Impact on Output of a 1 Percent Anticipated Tax Cut for Alternative Imple-
mentation Lag. Notes: we consider an unanticipated tax reform (labelled “surprise”) and
anticipated tax reforms where the anticipation horizon T varies between 6 and 10.
40A Data
A.1 Data for Figure 1
Figure 1 plots labor and consumption tax rates over the period 1990-2007 for six OECD countries:
Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Both labor and consumption tax are taken
from Mc Daniel [2007] who provides eﬀective tax rates for a sample of ﬁfteen OECD countries
covering the period 1950-2007. Note that the data are taken from Mc Daniel as she estimates the
aggregate labor tax as equal to the payroll tax rate (paid by employer and employee) plus the
tax rate on household income. Further details of calculation can be retrieved in Mc Daniel [2007].
The procedure for choosing the six countries is as follows. Over the period 1990-1994, the labor
tax rate averages 0.345. Nine countries, including the six above plus Austria, Germany, and the
Netherlands, feature labor tax rates that are higher than average. Among these nine countries,
only six have unemployment rates that are higher than average. Note than we took the average of
unemployment over 1993-1994 rather than 1990-1994 since the unemployment rate is not available
for Austria before 1993. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
A.2 Data for Calibration
Table 3 shows the non-tradable content of GDP, employment, consumption, gross ﬁxed capital
formation and government spending, and gives the share of government spending on the traded and
non-traded good in the sectoral output, the shares of capital income in output in both sectors, and
the markup charged by the non-traded sector for 14 OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
United States). The choice of these countries has been dictated by data availability. For the
countries of our sample, the period runs from 1990 to 2004. Details of construction of the data can
be retrieved in Cardi and Restout [2011].
Table 3 also summarizes eﬀective tax rates for the countries of our sample. The employers’ part
of labor taxes denoted by τF in the text is calculated as ESS/(IE − ESS), where ESS equal to
employers’ social security contributions and IE equal to total compensation for employees; ESS
comprise taxes paid by employers (2200) and taxes on payroll and workforce (3000). Source: OECD
National Accounts.
The employees’ part of labor taxes denoted by τH in the text is the labor income tax rate plus
the rate of contribution to social security to be paid by households. It is calculated as DT/HCR,
with DT equal to income tax (1110) plus employees’ social security contributions (2100) and HCR
equal to compensation of employees less labor taxes paid by employers. Source: OECD National
Accounts.
We have computed the ratio TI/W, with TI taxable income and W the gross wage earnings
before taxes. To calibrate the model, we set tax allowances κ to target this ratio. Source: OECD
National Accounts.
The consumption tax denoted by τC in the text is TGS/CC with TGS corresponding to taxes
on goods and services (5110 + 5121), and CC represents the ﬁnal consumption expenditure of
households and of general government. Source: OECD National Accounts.
41Table 3: Data to Calibrate the Two-Sector Model: Non Tradable Share and Tax Rates (1990-2004)
Countries Non tradable Share G
j/Y
j Capital Share Markup Tax











AUT 0.70 0.66 0.47 0.60 0.91 0.28 0.06 0.33 0.35 1.37 0.17 0.36 0.23 0.77
BEL 0.71 0.71 0.44 n.a. 0.84 0.29 0.08 0.35 0.34 1.31 0.14 0.42 0.20 0.80
CAN 0.68 0.72 0.48 0.62 0.91 0.28 0.06 0.47 0.38 1.43 0.10 0.32 0.08 n.a.
DEU 0.69 0.67 0.44 0.61 0.90 0.28 0.07 0.23 0.37 1.45 0.14 0.33 0.15 0.92
DNK 0.71 0.71 0.47 0.53 0.93 0.39 0.07 0.35 0.32 1.33 0.24 0.50 0.01 0.88
FIN 0.61 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.89 0.37 0.08 0.40 0.28 1.33 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.93
FRA 0.74 0.70 0.44 0.61 0.94 0.33 0.06 0.29 0.36 1.41 0.15 0.28 0.31 0.60
GBR 0.69 0.73 0.58 0.51 0.93 0.30 0.05 0.29 0.29 1.28 0.14 0.24 0.07 0.83
ITA 0.68 0.64 0.41 0.52 0.91 0.28 0.06 0.28 0.37 1.57 0.12 0.39 0.27 0.82
JPN 0.69 0.66 0.45 0.59 n.a. n.a n.a. 0.42 0.38 1.46 0.06 0.20 0.09 0.50
NLD 0.71 0.73 0.45 0.62 0.92 0.33 0.07 0.39 0.31 1.31 0.16 0.35 0.08 0.96
SPA 0.68 0.67 0.50 0.65 0.91 0.26 0.05 0.41 0.34 1.33 0.12 0.22 0.21 0.66
SWE 0.68 0.71 0.51 0.47 0.91 0.42 0.09 0.34 0.32 1.32 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.94
USA 0.73 0.76 0.53 0.58 0.90 0.20 0.06 0.38 0.32 1.35 0.04 0.23 0.06 0.78
Average 0.69 0.69 0.48 0.58 0.91 0.31 0.07 0.35 0.34 1.38 0.14 0.33 0.17 0.80
Notes: G
j/Y
j is the share of government spending on good j in output of sector j; θ
j is the share of capital income in output of sector j = T,N; µ is the
markup charged by the non-traded sector; τ
C is the consumption tax rate, τ
H: the employee’ part of labor taxes, τ
F the employer’ part of labor taxes.
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Olivier CARDI and Romain RESTOUTA Short-Run Static Solutions
In this section, we compute short-run static solutions. It is worthwhile noting that in this paper,
we assume that the non-traded sector is imperfectly competitive and charges a markup denoted by
 . We also allow for the markup to be endogenous in section 6 in the text. In order to isolate
the inﬂuence of markup variations on variables, i.e. the competition channel, we express variables
in terms of the markup; hence, we treat   as an exogenous variable in computing short-run static
solutions. For example, if a short-run static solution is given by x = x
 ¯ λ,P, 
 
with ¯ λ the shadow
value of wealth, P the relative price of non tradables and   the markup, the variable x is only aﬀected
by ¯ λ and P in the case of ﬁxed markup while x is inﬂuenced also by the competition channel when
we allow for the markup to be endogenous. In section N, we set out the model with an imperfectly
competitive non-traded sector, assuming that a limited number of competitors operate within each
sector. When the number of competitors is large, the imperfectly competitive non-traded sector
charges a ﬁxed markup.
A.1 Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption-Side
Static eﬃciency conditions (5b) and (5c) can be solved for real consumption and labor which of
course must hold at any point of time:
c = C
 ¯ λ,P,τC 
, L = L







































































2 (kN − kT)
≷ 0, (42h)
where σC = − uC
uCCC > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption,
σL = vL
vLLL > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor. We denoted by




i < 1 as long as κ > 0; if κ = 0, then Λ = 1.
Denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the non
tradable good and inserting short-run solution for consumption (41) into intra-temporal allocations
between non tradable and tradable goods, we solve for CT and CN:
CT = CT  ¯ λ,P,τC 





































C = φ(1 − αC) > 0 and P′
CC = CN.
A.2 Short-Run Static Solutions for Production-Side
Sectoral Capital-Labor Ratios
First-order conditions (6) can be solved for the sectoral capital intensities:


















































































2 (kN − kT)
≷ 0. (48c)
Sectoral Labor
Substituting short-run static solutions for labor (41) and capital-labor ratios (45) into the re-
source constraints for capital and labor (16), we can solve for traded and non-traded labor as follows:
LT = LT  
K,P, ¯ λ,τF,τH, 
 
, LN = LN  








































































kN − kT σLL
(W − κ)











































































kN − kT σLL
(W − κ)
WA ≷ 0, (50l)
where WF = W
 
1 + τF 
.
Sectoral Output
Inserting short-run static solutions for capital-labor ratios (45) and for labor (50) into the
production functions, we can solve for the traded, Y T = LTkT, and the non traded output, Y N =
LNhN:
Y T = Y T  
K,P, ¯ λ,τF,τH, 
 
, Y N = Y N  













































































kN − kT σLL
(W − κ)





















































































kN − kT σLL
(W − κ)
WA ≷ 0. (52l)
As it will be useful to calculate tax multipliers for output, we give the partial derivatives of













kN − kT ≶ 0. (53)
Useful Properties








 (kN − kT)
≶ 0, (54a)
 Y T
K + pY N
K =
 f − Ph













 2 (kN − kT)
≷ 0, (54d)
Y T








kN f − kTPh
 


















WA WF < 0, (54g)




kN − kT  
and kN f−kTPh = P
 
h − hKkN  
kN − kT 
=
 WF  
kN − kT 
.




, the rental rate of capital denoted by RK
can be expressed as a function of the real exchange rate P and the mark-up  :
RK = RK (P, ), (55)















 2 (kN − kT)
≶ 0. (56b)
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions




Y N  
K,P, ¯ λ,τF,τH 
− CN  ¯ λ,P,τC 
− δKK − GN, (57a)
˙ P = P
 





Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting ˜ X = ˜ K, ˜ P the long-term
values of X = K,P, we obtain in a matrix form:
 




K(t) − ˜ K,P(t) − ˜ P
 T
, (58)
















˜ kN − ˜ kT





P > 0, (60a)















By denoting ν the eigenvalue of matrix J, the characteristic equation for the matrix of the
























The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2×2 matrix (58) is unambiguously negative:48












  ˜ P
 
˜ kN − ˜ kT





and the trace denoted by Tr given by














− δK = r⋆ > 0, (63)
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium hk
  = r⋆ + δK.


















≷ 0, i = 1,2. (64)
















   
≷ 0, i = 1,2. (65)
48Starting from the equality of labor marginal products between sectors, using the fact that fk = Phk
and hk = r
⋆ + δK, it is straightforward to prove that b11 is positive in the case k
N > k
T.
50We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r⋆ < ν2. (66)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, P, the equilibrium yields a
unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
Formal Solutions for K and P
General solutions paths are given by :
K(t) − ˜ K = B1eν1t + B2eν2t, (67a)
P(t) − ˜ P = ω1
2B1eν1t + ω2
2B2eν2t, (67b)
where we normalized ωi
1 to unity. The eigenvector ωi















˜ kN − ˜ kT






P > 0, (69b)
where CN
P is given by (44e).
Case kN > kT
This assumption reﬂects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the non-traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor of the traded sector. From (65), the stable and unstable eigenvalues can





˜ kN − ˜ kT





˜ kN − ˜ kT
  − δK > 0, (70b)
since we suppose that kN > kT.
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y N
K =  (ν2 + δK) > 0, (71a)
Y T




= −ν1 > 0, (71c)
Y N










¯ λ = −
1
¯ λ
σL˜ L˜ kT (ν2 + δK) < 0, (71f)
Y T
¯ λ = −
1
¯ λ
σL˜ L ˜ P˜ kNν1 > 0. (71g)



















Case kT > kN
This assumption reﬂects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the traded good sector exceeds
the capital-labor ratio of the non traded sector. From (65), the stable and unstable eigenvalues can





˜ kN − ˜ kT





˜ kN − ˜ kT
  > 0, (73b)
51since we suppose that kT > kN.
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y N
K =  (ν1 + δK) < 0, (74a)
Y T




= −ν2 < 0, (74c)
Y N










¯ λ = −
1
¯ λ
σL˜ L˜ kT (ν1 + δK) > 0, (74f)
Y T
¯ λ = −
1
¯ λ
σL˜ L ˜ P˜ kNν2 < 0. (74g)




















In this section, we ﬁrst derive the current account equation and then determine the formal solution
for the stock of foreign assets.
Derivation of the Current Account Equation
Using the deﬁnition of lump-sum transfer Z given by (8), and substituting the market clearing
condition for non traded goods (10) into (3) yields:
˙ B = r⋆B(t) + RKK(t) + WAL(t) − PC
 
1 + τC 









− CN − GN
 
.
Using the fact that LT +LN = L, KT +KN = K, the dynamic equation for the current account
can be rewritten as follows:
















− CT − GT,
= r⋆B + Y T − CT − GT,
where the overall variable cost WFLN + RKKN in the non traded sector and output net of ﬁxed
cost in that sector, i. e. P Y
N
  = PZN, cancel each other.49
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We now derive the formal solution for the stock of foreign assets. Inserting ﬁrst the short-run
static solutions for consumption in tradables given by (43) and output in the traded sector given by
(51) into the current account dynamic equation (13) and linearizing around the steady-state yields:
˙ B(t) = r⋆
 

















P is given by (44b).
Inserting general solutions for K(t) and P(t) given by eqs. (67), the solution for the stock of
foreign assets is:
˙ B(t) = r⋆
 
















Solving the diﬀerential equation leads to:
B(t) − ˜ B =
  
B0 − ˜ B
 
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
 
er
⋆t + Φ1B1eν1t + Φ2B2eν2t, (78)







































νi − r⋆ , i = 1,2. (79)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the terms in brackets of equa-
tion (78) must be null and which implies B2 = 0. We get the linearized version of the nation’s
intertemporal budget constraint:
B0 − ˜ B = Φ1
 
K0 − ˜ K
 
. (80)
The stable solution for net foreign assets ﬁnally reduces to:
B(t) − ˜ B = Φ1
 
K(t) − ˜ K
 
. (81)
Case kN > kT
















σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kT (ν2 + δK) ˜ Λ
  
≷ 0, (82a)










K = ˜ Pν1 < 0, (82c)
where (82c) follows from the fact that ω2
2 = 0. We made use of property (54a) together with the fact
that CT
P = PCCP −pCN
P to compute Y T
P −CT





  − CN
P
 
−PCCP −σL˜ L˜ kT (ν2 + δK) ˜ Λ ≷ 0.
Since it is equal to N1
ν1−r⋆, Φ1 is given by:







σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kT (ν2 + δK) ˜ Λ
  
(83)
and Φ2 = N2
ν2−r⋆ = − ˜ P.
The sign of Φ1 is ambiguous and reﬂects the impact of the capital accumulation on the net
foreign assets accumulation along a stable transitional path:
˙ B(t) = Φ1 ˙ K(t).
where ˙ K(t) = ν1B1eν1t. Following empirical evidence suggesting that the current account and
investment are negatively correlated (see e. g. Glick and Rogoﬀ [1995]), we will impose thereafter:
Assumption 1 Φ1 < 0 which implies that N1 > 0.






σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kT (ν2 + δK) ˜ Λ
 
. (84)
For all parametrization, the inequality above holds.
Case kT > kN










K = ˜ Pν2 > 0, (85a)
















σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kT (ν1 + δk) ˜ Λ
  
,≶ 0, (85b)
where (86) follows from the fact that ω1
2 = 0. We made use of property (54a) together with
CT
P = PCCP − PCN
P to compute Y T
P − CT





  − CN
P
 
− PCCP − σL˜ L˜ kT (ν1 + δK) ≷ 0.
Hence, Φ1 = N1
ν1−r⋆ = − ˜ P. Furthermore, since it is equal to N2
ν2−r⋆, Φ2 is given by:











D.1 Formal Solution for Financial Wealth
The law of motion for ﬁnancial wealth (S(t) = ˙ A(t)) is given by:










 ¯ λ,P,τF,τH 
−PC (P)
 
1 + τC 
C
 ¯ λ,P,τC 
+Z,
(87)
with Z = τCPCC +
  
τH + τF 
w − τHκ
 
L − GT − ˜ PGN.
The linearized version of (87) is:
˙ A(t) = r⋆
 




P(t) − ˜ P
 
, (88)
with M1 given by
M1 =
 
WP ˜ L + ˜ WLP
  
1 + τF 
−
 





1 + τF  ˜ LWP
 









˜ K (ν2 + δK) +
 
σL˜ L˜ Λ˜ kT (ν2 + δK) − σC ˜ CN
  
< 0. (89)
From the second line of (89), if σC < 1 as empirical studies suggest, then the term in square brackets
is positive and M1 is negative. The last line has been computed by using the fact that ˜ L = ˜ LN + ˜ LT
and ˜ K = ˜ kT ˜ LT + ˜ kN ˜ LN which allows to simplify 1
 
 
˜ Y N + ˜ L˜ kT (ν2 + δK) 
 
to ˜ K (ν2 + δK).
The general solution for the stock of ﬁnancial wealth is:
A(t) = ˜ A +
  











ν1 − r⋆B1eν1t, (90)
where we used the fact that ω2
2 = 0.
Invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the stable solution for ﬁnancial wealth:
A(t) = ˜ A +
M1ω1
2
ν1 − r⋆B1eν1t, (91)
and the intertemporal solvency condition





˜ K − K0
 
. (92)
D.2 Steady-State and Dynamic Eﬀects of Tax Changes







˜ Kν2 + σL˜ L˜ kTν2 − σC ˜ CN
  d ˜ K
dτj . (93)
Diﬀerentiating (91) w. r. t. τC and τj (j = F,H), gives the dynamics for savings:





dτC dτCeν1t > 0, (94a)





dτj dτjeν1t < 0, j = F,H, (94b)
where B1
dτC = − d ˜ K
dτC < 0 and B1
dτj = −d ˜ K
dτj > 0 as it is shown in the next section.
E Long-Run Eﬀects of Labor and Consumption Tax Changes
In this section, we calculate formal expressions of steady-state changes. For clarity purpose, we
assume that δK = 0 since it does not modify qualitatively the long-run eﬀects of tax policies. This
assumption will be relaxed in numerical analysis. We totally diﬀerentiate the steady-state which






































































  dτH + CN
τCdτC
−Y T





































We have to consider two cases, depending on wether the non traded sector is more or less capital





σL ˜ WF ˜ L + σCPC ˜ C
 














σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν2
  
σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν2˜ Λ
  
> 0, (97b)
case kN > kT,
where we used the fact that and  fkN−PhkT =  WF  










≡ WF if kN > kT.
Useful Expressions













˜ h ˜ f
 












αC ˜ f + (1 − αC) ˜ P˜ h
 












−σL˜ L˜ kT ˜ h
 
˜ kN − ˜ kT









σL˜ L˜ kN ˜ f
˜ P
 
˜ kN − ˜ kT









































¯ λ − CT












































τH = − ˜ Pν1ν2σL˜ L
 






















where we used the fact that Y T




  −σL˜ L˜ Λ˜ kTν2, CT
P = PCCP − ˜ PCN
P and PCCP = −σC ˜ CN
to rewrite Y T
P − CT
P (see (99h)).



















K − (1 − αC)PCY N













¯ λ − CT


















































K + r⋆Φ1 = − ˜ Pν1. (100h)
E.1 Long-Run Eﬀects of an Unanticipated Permanent Consumption Tax
Change




σC ˜ CσL˜ L
∆(1 + τC)
  
































































dτC > 0, (101e)
where ∆ =
  










σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν2
  











σC ˜ CσL ˜ WF ˜ L









σCPC ˜ CσL˜ L





















σCPC ˜ CσL˜ L
σL ˜ WF ˜ L + σCPC ˜ C
 
 




dτC = − ˜ P
d ˜ K
dτC > 0. (102e)
E.2 Long-Run Eﬀects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in Payroll
Taxes
Case kN > kT
56d ˜ C




























































dτF > 0, (103e)
where we used the fact that ˜ P
 
ν2˜ kT + ν1˜ kN
 
= − ˜ P
 
˜ h − hk˜ kN
 
≡ − ˜ WF.
Case kT > kN
d ˜ C












σCPC ˜ C, (104b)
d¯ λ


















dτF = − ˜ P
d ˜ K
dτF > 0, (104e)
where we let ∆ ≡ σL ˜ WF ˜ L+σCPC ˜ C and we used the fact that − ˜ P
 








E.3 Long-Run Eﬀects of an Unanticipated Permanent Progressive Wage
Tax Change
Case kN > kT
d ˜ C




































































dτH > 0, (105e)
where we used the fact that
˜ W(1−τ
H)
˜ W A = ˜ Λ.
case kT > kN
57d ˜ C




˜ W − κ
 
˜ WA






˜ W − κ
 
˜ WA σCPC ˜ C < 0, (106b)
d¯ λ




˜ W − κ
 
˜ WA






˜ W − κ
 
˜ WA σCPC ˜ C
 




dτH = − ˜ P
d ˜ K
dτH > 0, (106e)
where we set ∆ = σL ˜ WF ˜ L + σCPC ˜ C.
E.4 Useful Properties
We denote by X the macroeconomic aggregates C,L,K,NX. Inspection of long-run changes shows

















E.5 Rewriting the Long-Run Eﬀects
In this subsection, we rewrite expressions of steady-state changes following a labor tax cut, i.e. after
a drop in τj (j = F,H) when the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector.
It is useful to introduce some notations:
ˆ τF =
dτF
1 + τF , ˆ τH =
dτH
1 − τH , (108a)
0 < ΛF ≡
 
1 − τH  ˜ W
˜ WA < 1, 0 < ΛH ≡
 
˜ W − κ
  
1 − τH 
˜ WA = 1 −
κ
˜ WA < 1, (108b)
0 < ˜ ξ ≡
σL ˜ WF ˜ L
σL ˜ WF ˜ L + σCPC ˜ C
< 1, (108c)
where we used the fact that ˜ W
 
1 − τH 
= ˜ WA − τHκ to determine (108b).
Case kT > kN
Denoting by a hat the percentage deviation relative to initial steady-state, the change in the
shadow value of wealth following a labor tax cut is:
ˆ ¯ λ = Λj˜ ξˆ τj < 0, j = F,H, (109)
where Λj˜ ξ < 1.
The change in labor following a labor tax cut is:
ˆ ˜ L = −σLΛj
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H, (110)
where Λj
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
< 1.
The change in the capital stock following a labor tax cut is:





1 − ˜ ξ
  
αC˜ kNν2 − (1 − αC)˜ kTν1
 
ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H, (111)
where Λj
 




αC˜ kNν2 − (1 − αC)˜ kTν1
 
> 0.
Remembering that the relative price of non tradables remains unaﬀected in the long-run, and
using the fact that d˜ Y
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L = ˜ WF, the change in aggregate output following a labor tax cut is:
ˆ ˜ Y =
 
1 − ˜ βL
 
ˆ ˜ K + ˜ βL
ˆ ˜ L > 0, (112)
where
 





˜ Y and ˜ βL =
˜ W
F ˜ L
˜ Y are the shares of capital and labor income in GDP,
respectively.
58E.6 Inelastic Labor Supply Case: σL = 0
To get further insight about the transmission mechanism, we derive the long-run eﬀects when labor
supply is inelastic, i.e. we set σL = 0.
Long-Run Eﬀects of an Unanticipated Permanent Consumption Tax Change
















From (113a)-(113b), the elasticity of the marginal utility of wealth is equal to unity in absolute
terms and the long-run levels of variables remain unaﬀected. A rise in consumption tax raises the
marginal cost of current consumption. Since the trade-oﬀ between labor and leisure turns out to be
irrelevant, total employment remains ﬁxed such that ¯ λ must fall by the same proportion than the
rise in τC thus leaving unaﬀected real consumption as the tax eﬀect and the wealth eﬀect cancel
each other. Since demand for non tradables and tradables remain unaﬀected, capital stock and net
foreign assets must not change for investment and the current account to be zero in the long-run.
As the capital stock remains unchanged in the long-run, dynamics degenerate.
Long-Run Eﬀects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in Payroll Taxes


















From (114a)-(114b), a fall in τF leaves unchanged the steady-state levels of variables, and more
importantly does no longer induce a wealth eﬀect. The explanation is that whenever the trade-oﬀ
between labor and leisure turns out to be irrelevant, total employment remains ﬁxed. To insure
that equality of sectoral labor marginal products holds, the wage must rise by the same proportion
than the fall in the payroll tax. As the capital stock remains unchanged in the long-run, dynamics
degenerate. In words, if labor is ﬁxed, a change in the tax on wage paid by producers induces solely
a tax eﬀect on the wage rate.
F The Two-Step Procedure: Wealth Eﬀect and Tax Eﬀects

















¯ λ, ˜ P,τC
 
− GN = 0, (115b)
r⋆ ˜ B + Y T
 




¯ λ, ˜ P,τC
 
− GT = 0, (115c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition
 




˜ K − KT
 
. (115d)
where K0 and B0 correspond to the initially predetermined stocks of physical capital and foreign
assets, the open economy starting from an initial steady-state at time T . If the ﬁscal shock is
permanent, then T = 0.
Derivation of Steady-State Functions
In a ﬁrst step, we solve the system (115a)-(115c) for ˜ P, ˜ K and ˜ B as functions of the marginal
utility of wealth, ¯ λ, the tax rates on consumption and labor together with the mark-up. Totally
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τCdτC − Y T
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The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth ¯ λ, tax rates (i.e., τC, τF, τH) and the
markup   determine the following steady-state values:
˜ P = P ( ), (117a)
˜ K = K
 ¯ λ,τC,τF,τH, 
 
, (117b)
˜ B = B
 ¯ λ,τC,τF,τH, 
 
, (117c)










σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
 







σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν2
 












˜ f ˜ CN + ˜ h ˜ CT
 



























˜ P ˜ CNν2 − ˜ CTν1
 
ν1r⋆ (1 + τC)




˜ P ˜ CNν1 − ˜ CTν2
 
ν2r⋆ (1 + τC)







































































































˜ LN ˜ f
 r⋆ ≷ 0,






















˜ LN ˜ f
 r⋆ ≷ 0,
if kN > kT (122f)







P to derive the ﬁrst equality of (122a). In addition, we
made use of the following property Y N
  = −P
 Y N
P and Y T
  = −P
 Y T
P to determine (122c)-(122d) and
(122e)-(122f). Finally, use has been made of property (54a) to rewrite Y T
P −CT
P and property (54b)
to simplify  Y T
K +  Y N
K which is equal to ˜ P r⋆ in the long-run.
Since the change in the markup modiﬁes the long-run levels of real consumption and labor
supply through the steady-state change in the relative price of non tradables, it is convenient to
write their steady-state functions by substituting (117a) into their static solutions (41) that hold in
the long-run:
C = m
 ¯ λ,τC, 
 
, L = n
 ¯ λ,τF,τH, 
 
, (123)
where partial derivatives are given by (42) evaluated at the steady-state (that’s why we substitute




= αCσC ˜ C
ν1
ν2
< 0, if kT > kN, (124a)
= αCσC ˜ C
ν2
ν1










 2 < 0, (124c)
where partial derivatives w. r. t. to ¯ λ, τC, τF, and τH are given by (42); we computed (124c) as











Following the same procedure, i. e. substituting the steady-state function for the real exchange

















 2 < 0, (126)



















˜ f < 0.
Finally, following a similar procedure, we can express the rental rate of physical capital as a
function of τF and  :
RK = RK ( ), (127)


















> 0, if kN > kT, (129)
and the partial derivative w. r. t. τF is given by (48b).
G Long-Term Eﬀects of Revenue-Neutral Tax Reforms
In this section, we derive the steady-state eﬀects of a shift of the tax burden from labor to consump-
tion. Since we consider a revenue-neutral tax reform, the consumption tax must change accordingly
to balance the budget after a labor tax cut. To derive the direction and the size of the change
in the consumption tax, we ﬁrst substitute short-run static solutions for consumption, wage and





















¯ λ, ˜ P,τF,τH
 
= Z, (130)
keeping in mind that the long-run value of the real exchange rate is unaﬀected by ﬁscal tax changes




In deriving the long-run eﬀects of revenue-neutral tax reforms, we concentrate on the case
kT > kN since we cannot determine the sign of formal expressions when kN > kT. However, as
shown by numerical results, the long-run eﬀects are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar
whether kT ≷ kN.
61G.1 Steady-State Changes: A Shift from Payroll Taxes to Consumption
Taxes
In this section, we estimate the long-run eﬀects of a shift from a payroll tax τF to a consumption tax
τC, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the government budget. Additionally, we assume that
taxes on labor income are progressive so that κ > 0 and Λ < 1. To avoid confusion, we denote by  
 j,C
the eﬀects of the tax reform which involves simultaneously cutting the tax j = F and increasing
the tax k = c so as to keep the government budget balanced. In brief, the tax reform strategy
involves simultaneously cutting the payroll tax by dτF < 0 and increasing the consumption tax
dτC|F,C > 0.
Holding τH constant, we diﬀerentiate (130)
PC ˜ CdτC 
 F,C





τF + τH 












τF + τH 









We denote by X the aggregate C,L,K,NX. By using the fact that d ˜ X
 
 F,C





, and by rearranging terms, we can determine the size of the rise in the consumption
tax rate τC 
 F,C











τCPC d ˜ C
dτF +
 









˜ W ˜ L
τCPC d ˜ C
dτC +
 
˜ WF − ˜ WA
 
d˜ L





where analytical expressions of χF and χC are shown below.
We ﬁrst compute χF which reﬂects two opposite eﬀects on tax revenues. Whereas a labor
tax cut lowers tax revenue, keeping unchanged consumption and employment, a labor tax cut raises






˜ W ˜ L =
˜ Λ
1+τF ˜ WA˜ L,














˜ WF − ˜ WA
˜ WF
   
, (133)
where 0 < ˜ ξ < 1 is given by (108c). As long as tax rates take reasonable values and the elasticity of
labor supply (i.e., σL) is not too large, χF is positive. Hence, a labor tax cut leads to a fall in tax
revenue, and more so the smaller σL and the lower the tax rates.
The same logic applies to a change in the consumption tax. Substituting long-run changes of C
and L given by eqs. (102a) and (102b), χC is given by:









˜ WF − ˜ WA
˜ WF
   
, (134)
where 0 < ˜ ξ < 1 is given by (108c). As long as tax rates take reasonable values and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for consumption (i.e., σC) is smaller than one, χC is positive. Hence, a rise
in consumption tax leads to a rise in tax revenue, and more so the smaller σC and the lower the tax
rates.
As long as σL, σC, τH, τF, τC take reasonable values, χF and χC are positive. Hence, according
to (132), a labor tax cut leads to a rise in the consumption tax. As shown in Panel B of Table 1, a
labor tax cut induces a rise in the consumption tax for all scenarios.
Since the consumption tax increases, we cannot exclude that macroeconomic variables decline
after a shift of the tax burden from labor to consumption. We show below that changes in aggregates
following a tax reform are simply a scaled-down version of the changes after a labor tax cut associated
with a fall in lump-sum transfer. The long-run change of a shift of the tax burden from labor to
consumption is equal to the sum of the impact of the labor tax cut by dτF < 0 ﬁnanced by a
lump-sum transfer (i.e., ∂ ˜ X
∂τF dτF) and the eﬀect triggered by a change in the consumption tax by
62dτC 
 j,C






































PC ˜ C (1 + τC)
 
dτF > 0, (135b)
where dτF < 0 and χF > 0, χC > 0. To derive (135a), we substituted eqs. (102c) and (104c). To
determine (135b), we used the fact that ∂ ˜ X






˜ Λ and substituted (132), by remembering








1+τF ˜ WA˜ L
 
+ PC ˜ C.
According to (135a), a labor tax cut induces unambiguously a decline in the marginal utility of
wealth since both a fall in τF and a rise in τC produce a drop in ¯ λ. According to eq. (135b), a shift
of the tax burden from labor to consumption raises unambiguously macroeconomic aggregates (i.e.,
C,L,K,NX) as long as χC > 0 and 0 <
˜ W
A ˜ L
PC ˜ C(1+τC) < 1. The former condition is easily fulﬁlled
if σC < 1 and tax rates take initially reasonable values. The latter condition is fulﬁlled as long as
r⋆ ˜ A + Z > 0 since it implies that ˜ WA˜ L < PC ˜ C
 
1 + τC 
. Hence, if the representative household
is a net creditor (i.e., ˜ A > 0), the consumption tax base is higher than the labor tax base so that
the rise in τC necessary to balance the government budget is smaller than the decline in the labor
tax cut. Finally, while τC increases to balance the government budget following the labor tax cut,
the tax reform produces an expansion of macroeconomic aggregates. Hence, the long-run change of
X = C,L,K,NX following a tax reform is simply a scaled-down version of the long-term change of
the aggregate X after a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a fall in lump-sum transfer. More formally, we
have:
d ˜ X
   F,C
= ΦF,C ∂ ˜ X
∂τF dτF, (136)








< 1 as long as χF > 0, χC > 0, and ˜ A > 0. Eq. (136)
corresponds to eq. (21) in the text.
G.2 Steady-State Changes: A Shift from Progressive Wage Taxes to Con-
sumption Taxes
In this section, we now estimate the long-run eﬀects of a shift from a progressive wage tax τH to a
consumption tax τC, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the government budget. Note that
the tax scheme is progressive as long as κ > 0 so that Λ < 1. To avoid confusion, we denote by the
superscript
   H,C
the eﬀects of a tax reform which involves simultaneously cutting the progressive
wage tax τH and increasing the consumption tax τC so as to balance the government budget.










τCPC d ˜ C
dτH +
 





˜ W − κ
 
˜ L
τCPC d ˜ C
dτC +
 
˜ WF − ˜ WA
 
d˜ L





where χC is given by (134) and χH can be written as follows:
χH =
 










˜ WF − ˜ WA
˜ WF
   
, (138)
where we have substituted the long-run changes of L and C (see eqs (106a) and (106b)) to derive
(138); 0 < ˜ ξ < 1 is given by (108c); χH reﬂects two conﬂictory eﬀects on tax revenues. Whereas
a labor tax cut lowers tax revenue, keeping unchanged consumption and employment, a labor tax
cut raises employment and consumption, and thereby tax revenues. As for χF, as long as tax rates
take reasonable values and the elasticity of labor supply (i.e., σL) is not too large, χH is positive.
Hence, a cut in progressive wage taxes leads to a fall in tax revenue, and more so the smaller σL
and the lower the tax rates. Since χC and χH are both positive for reasonable values of parameters
(i.e., σC and σL) and tax rates, the consumption tax must increase to balance the budget following
a cut in progressive wage taxes.
63Since the consumption tax increases, we cannot exclude that macroeconomic variables decline
after a shift of the tax burden from labor to consumption. We show below that changes in aggregates
following a tax reform are simply a scaled-down version of the changes after a labor tax cut associated
with a fall in lump-sum transfer. We denote by X the aggregates C,L,K,NX. The long-run eﬀect
of a shift of the tax burden from labor to consumption is equal to the sum of the impact of the
labor tax cut by dτH < 0 ﬁnanced by a lump-sum transfer (i.e., ∂ ˜ X
∂τH dτH) and the eﬀect triggered
by a change in the consumption tax by dτC 
 j,C








































PC ˜ C (1 + τC)
 
dτH, (139b)
where dτH < 0 and χH > 0, χC > 0. To derive (139a), we substituted eqs. (102c) and (106c).
To determine (139b), , we used the fact that ∂ ˜ X









and substituted (137), by













+ PC ˜ C.
According to (139a), a cut in progressive wage taxes induces unambiguously a decline in the
marginal utility of wealth since both a fall in τH and a rise in τC produce a drop in ¯ λ. According to
eq. (139b), a shift of the tax burden from labor to consumption raises unambiguously macroeconomic
aggregates (i.e., C,L,K,NX) as long as χC > 0 and 0 <
˜ W
A ˜ L
PC ˜ C(1+τC) < 1. As stressed previously,
the former condition is fulﬁlled if σC < 1 and tax rates take initially reasonable values. The latter
condition is fulﬁlled as long as r⋆ ˜ A+Z > 0 since it implies that ˜ WA˜ L < PC ˜ C
 
1 + τC 
. Hence, if the
representative household is a net creditor (i.e., ˜ A > 0), the consumption tax base is higher than the
labor tax base so that the rise in τC necessary to balance the government budget is smaller than the
decline in the labor tax cut. Finally, while τC increases to balance the government budget following
the labor tax cut, the tax reform produces an expansion of macroeconomic aggregates. Hence, the
long-run change of X = C,L,K,NX following a tax reform is simply a scaled-down version of the
long-term change of the aggregate X after a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a fall in lump-sum transfer.




= ΦH,C ∂ ˜ X
∂τH dτH, (140)
where ΦH,C < 1 as long as χH > 0, χC > 0, and ˜ A > 0.
G.3 Derivation of Formal Expressions in the Text
Having determined the long-run eﬀects of a revenue-neutral tax reform which involves a tax cut in
payroll taxes or in progressive wage taxes coordinated with a rise in the consumption tax so as to
balance the government budget, we present below the main steps to derive expressions in the text.
We denote by the superscript
 
 j,C
the eﬀects of a fall in the labor tax by dτj < 0 (j = F,H)
coordinated with a rise in the consumption tax rate by dτC 
 j,C
which is endogenously determined
so as the government budget constraint is met. Assuming that the stock of ﬁnancial wealth plus
transfers is positive, the labor tax base is smaller than the consumption tax base. Hence, τC must
increase less than the drop in labor tax to balance the budget. As a result, denoting by X the
macroeconomic aggregates C,L,K,NX, the long-term eﬀect of a tax reform is simply a scaled-
down version of the long-term change in the aggregate X after a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a fall in
lump-sum transfer. This point is formalized below.
To start with, we rewrite the change in the consumption tax by denoting ΓC = χC  
1 + τC 
and Γj =
 
1 ± τj 
:



















   








˜ W F− ˜ W A
˜ W F
    ˆ τj > 0, (141)
where ˆ τF = dτ
F
1+τF , ˆ τH = dτ
H
1−τH , and we set 0 < ΛF ≡ (1−τ
H) ˜ W
˜ W A < 1, and 0 < ΛH ≡ 1 − κ
˜ W A < 1.
Eq. (141) corresponds to eq. (19) in the text.
64The long-term change in the aggregate X = C,L,K,NX following a shift of the tax burden
from labor to consumption is equal to the sum of the expansionary impact of the labor tax cut by
dτj < 0 (j = F,H) ﬁnanced by a lump-sum transfer (i.e., ∂ ˜ X
∂τj dτj > 0) and the recessionary eﬀect
triggered by the rise in the consumption tax by dτC   j,C
(i.e., ∂ ˜ X
∂τC dτC   j,C






ˆ τj ˆ τj +
ˆ ˜ X
ˆ τC ˆ τC 
 j,C
,
Using the fact that
ˆ ˜ X
ˆ τC = 1
Λj
















ˆ τj ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H, (142)








< 1. Eq. (142) corresponds to eq. (21) in the text.
Denoting by 0 < ˜ ξ ≡ σL ˜ W
F ˜ L
σL ˜ W F ˜ L+σCPC ˜ C < 1, and denoting by a hat the percentage deviation of
the aggregate from its initial steady-state value, (135a) and (139a) can be reduced to:
ˆ ¯ λ
   j,C
= ˜ ξΛjˆ τj −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
ˆ τC   j,C
< 0, j = F,H. (143)





χC ˆ τj > 0. Eq. (143) corresponds to eq. (20) in the text.







1 − ˜ ξ
 
ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H. (144)
Eq. (144) corresponds to eq. (22) in the text.









1 − ˜ ξ
  
αC˜ kNν2 − (1 − αC)˜ kTν1
 
ˆ τj > 0, j = F,H, (145)
Eq. (145) corresponds to eq. (23) in the text.

















Eq. (146) corresponds to eq. (24) in the text. To derive (146), we used the fact that Y T ≡






























L = ˜ WF.
H Tax Wedge: Some Deﬁnitions
In line with general practice, payroll taxes are assumed to be proportional and wage income taxes
are taken to be progressive. Following Heijdra and Lightart [2009], we deﬁne the average tax
wedge as the diﬀerence between the producer wage (paid by the ﬁrm) and the purchasing power





1 + τF 
−
  















where WF = W
 
1 + τF 
. In addition, we denote by τM the marginal tax wedge as the diﬀerence
between the producer wage (paid by the ﬁrm) and the after-tax marginal wage expressed as a




1 + τF 
− WL
 





1 − τH 
(1 + τF)
. (148)
65The closer to unity τM, the larger the gap between the wage paid by ﬁrms and the real wage received
by households.
Using the deﬁnition of τM given by (148), we can rewrite the average tax wedge as follows:
τA ≡ τM −
τHκ
WF . (149)






≡ τM − τA =
τHκ
XF , (150)
where WF = W
 
1 + τF 





As the average tax burden τA rises with the wage rate, the system tax is progressive such that
Γ(.) > 0 which holds as long as κ > 0. It is worth emphasizing that our approach which deﬁnes
the average tax together with the marginal tax wedge by taking into account the wage paid by
the ﬁrm allows for “scaling” the tax burden faced by households in terms of ﬁrms’ labor cost, the
index of average tax progression being expressed in terms of consumption goods; that’s why we use
the “wedge” label. By abstracting from this “scaling” approach, we would deﬁne the marginal and
average tax wedges together with the coeﬃcient of average tax progression as follows : τM ≡ τHw,
τA ≡ τH (W − κ) and Γ ≡ τHκ > 0 (as long as κ > 0).
I A Tax reform Keeping Unchanged the Marginal Tax Wedge
In this section, we consider a labor tax strategy which involves simultaneously cutting a payroll tax
by dτF < 0 and increasing a progressive wage tax by dτH > 0 so as to leave unchanged the marginal
tax wedge, i. e. dτM = 0. By making use of (148), the labor tax reform strategy requires a rise in
the wage income tax by the following amount:
dτH 
 F,H
≡ −θdτF, θ ≡
1 − τH
1 + τF < 1. (151)
Eq. (151) corresponds to eq. (27) in the text. According to eq. (151), the progressive wage tax
must be increased by a smaller amount than the fall in τF so as to leave unchanged the marginal
tax wedge.
Substituting the short-run static solution for the wage rate (47) that holds in the long-run, and
diﬀerentiating the coeﬃcient of average tax progression (150) w. r. t. τH and τF, and then using
(151), we ﬁnd that the tax reform raises the degree of average tax progression:
dΓ = −
κ
WF θdτF > 0, (152)
where dτF < 0 since we considered a fall in payroll taxes. The explanation comes from the fact that
the wage rate is raised by the same proportion than the fall in τF. Consequently, as long as κ > 0,
the rise in τH leads to an increase in Γ.
Making use of long-term eﬀects of permanent changes in τF and τH and substituting dτH   F,H
given by (151), we are able to estimate the directions and the sizes of the long-run changes of main
economic variables after a fall in τF associated with a rise in τH by an amount that leaves unaﬀected
τM. We derive below the steady-state eﬀects of a tax reform keeping unchanged the marginal tax
wedge by assuming that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector.
If kT > kN, denoting macroeconomic aggregates C,L,K,NX by X, and denoting by a hat the
percentage deviation from initial steady-state, steady-state changes are given by:
ˆ ¯ λ
   F,H
=
ˆ ¯ λ
ˆ τF ˆ τF +
ˆ ¯ λ




ΛF − ΛH 
ˆ τF ≶ 0,
= ˜ ξΛF κ
˜ W






ˆ τF ˆ τF +
ˆ ˜ X

















66where ˆ τF < 0 and ˜ ξ, ΛF and ΛH are given by (108); to get (153b), we used the fact that
ˆ ˜ X





and ˆ τH   F,H




˜ W to get (153c). Eq. (153c) corresponds to
eq. (28) in the text.
J Dynamic Eﬀects of a Tax Reform
This section estimates the dynamic eﬀects of a tax restructuring. Steady-state changes are those
derived in the previous section where we estimated the long-run variations such that the rise in τC
guarantees that the balanced condition for the government holds. Note that the change of the tax
scheme can be viewed as an unanticipated permanent tax shock.
The stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path in (K,P)-space. The capital
stock, the real exchange rate, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:
K(t) = ˜ K + B1eν1t, (154a)
P(t) = ˜ P + ω1
2B1eν1t, (154b)
B(t) = ˜ B + Φ1B1eν1t, (154c)
where ω1
2 = 0,Φ1 = − ˜ P if kT > kN and with
B1 = K0 − ˜ K = −d ˜ K
 
 j,k
= −Φj,k d ˜ K
dτj dτj,
where we made use of the constancy of K at time t = 0 (i. e. K0 is predetermined).
In section F, we show that steady-state values of macroeconomic aggregates can be expressed
as function of the marginal utility of wealth and tax rates. Using (142) and totally diﬀerentiating
eq. (117b) yields the steady-state change of the capital stock after a tax shock:
d ˜ K
   j,k
= Φj,k (K¯ λλτj + Kτj)dτj, (155)
where the ﬁrst term on the RHS reﬂects the impact of the wealth eﬀect on steady-state capital stock
while the second term represents the inﬂuence of the tax eﬀect.
J.1 Investment and Current Account
We derive the initial reactions of investment and the current account by abstracting from depre-
ciation of physical capital to avoid uninteresting complications. As previously, we consider that
kT > kN to avoid uninteresting complications.
Diﬀerentiating (154a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, and substituting (155), the initial
response of investment is:
I(0)
   j,k





σC ˜ CN − ν1σL˜ L˜ kT
 
+ ν1σL˜ L˜ kT
 
ˆ τj ≷ 0, j = F,H, (156)
where ˆ τF = dτ
F
1+τF , ˆ τH = dτ
H
1+τH , 0 < ΛF ≡ (1−τ
H) ˜ W
˜ W A < 1, 0 < ΛH ≡ 1 − κ
˜ W A < 1, 0 < ˜ ξ ≡
σL ˜ W
F ˜ L
σL ˜ W F ˜ L+σCPC ˜ C < 1. Eq. (156) corresponds to eq. (25) in the text.
By using the steady-state change of the capital stock after a labor tax cut given by (104d), we
are able to sign eq. (156):
I(0)










αC˜ kNν2 − (1 − αC)˜ kTν1
 
ˆ τj,> 0, j = F,H, (157)
where 0 ≤ Λj ≤ 1 and 0 < ˜ ξ < 1.
Diﬀerentiating the stable solution for foreign bonds (154c) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0,







= − ˜ PI(0)
 
 j,k
< 0, j = F,H, (158)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = − ˜ P.
67J.2 Labor Share
Before analyzing the short-run distribution eﬀects of a labor tax cut, we investigate the steady-state
change of the labor share. The share of labor income in GDP is deﬁned as follows:
˜ βL =
˜ WF ˜ L
˜ WF ˜ L + ˜ RK ˜ K
=
˜ ω
˜ ω + ˜ k
(159)
where ˜ RK = ˜ Pr⋆; we denoted by ˜ ω = ˜ WF/ ˜ RK the wage-interest ratio and by ˜ k = ˜ K/˜ L the capital-
labor ratio. As long as the relative price of non tradables ˜ P is unaﬀected by the tax shock, the
wage-interest ratio ˜ ω remains unaﬀected. Hence, the labor share movement is driven only by the
capital-labor ratio. Eq. (159) corresponds to eq. (30) in the text.
Diﬀerentiating eq. (159), we have:
d˜ βL = ˜ βL
 









To analyze the distributions eﬀects of a tax reform in the short-run, we have to linearize βL =
W(P)(1+τ
F)L(P)
Y (K,L) in the neighborhood of the steady-state:50




















˜ P˜ h˜ kT
˜ WF 
 





1 − ˜ βL
   ω1
2
˜ P









where we substituted P(t) − ˜ P = ω1
2
 
K(t) − ˜ K
 
.
If kT > kN, then ω1
2 = 0. Hence, evaluating (161) at time t = 0 and diﬀerentiating yields:
dβL(0) = d˜ βL + ˜ βL
 
1 − ˜ βL




1 − ˜ βL
  d˜ L
˜ L
> 0, (162)
where we used the fact that K is initially predetermined. Hence, a labor tax cut unambiguously
raises the labor share βL on impact. Eq. (162) corresponds to eq. (31a) in the text.
Diﬀerentiating (161) w.r.t. time, we ﬁnd that capital accumulation lowers unambiguously the
labor share along the transitional path:
˙ βL(t) = −˜ βL
 
1 − ˜ βL
  ˙ K(t)
˜ K
< 0. (163)
If kN > kT, the initial response of the labor share to a labor tax cut is given by:




˜ P˜ h˜ kT
˜ WF 
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2
˜ P
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where the sign of (164) is ambiguous. If kN > kT, the ﬁrst term on the RHS is positive, i.e., the
rise in labor supply exerts a positive impact on the labor share, while the second term is negative,
i.e., the initial appreciation in the relative price of non tradables exerts a negative impact on βL.
Eq. (164) corresponds to eq. (31b) in the text.
K Tax Multipliers
In this section, we derive analytical expressions of tax multipliers for overall and sectoral output.
50We have used the short-run static solutions for W,L,Y by abstracting from exogenous variables for
clarity purpose.
68K.1 Tax Multiplier for Overall Output
Long-Run Tax Multiplier
Because overall output denoted by Y is the sum of traded output Y T and non traded output
measured in terms of the traded good P
 Y N, using the fact that Y T ≡ Y T (K,L,p) and Y N ≡
Y N (K,L,p), remembering that steady-state level of the real exchange rate is unaﬀected by a tax
reform, the steady-state change of overall output is:
d˜ Y






















   j,k
,
= ˜ Pr⋆d ˜ K
   j,k
+ WFd˜ L
   j,k
> 0. (165)
where we use properties (54b) and (54c) to get (165).
Initial Tax Multiplier
Adopting a similar procedure keeping in mind that the capital stock is initially predetermined,
the short-run tax multiplier is:
dY (0)






















   j,k
,
= WFdL(0)
   j,k
> 0, (166)
where we use properties (54c) to get (166); according to property (54a), denoting by a hat the
partial derivative of Y w. r. t. P for given labor, ˆ Y T
P + P
  ˆ Y N
P = 0;
K.2 Tax Multipliers for Sectoral Outputs
Long-Run Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
We calculate the tax multiplier for traded output by diﬀerentiating the short-run static solution
for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:


































σC ˜ CN − σL˜ LkTν2˜ Λ
  
Φdτj > 0, j = F,H, (167)









j = F,H) as long as ˜ a > 0, and ΦF,H =
˜ W
κ > 0. To derive (167), we used the fact that Y T
L =
− ˜ Pν1˜ kN > 0, Y T
K = ˜ Pν1 < 0,
 





˜ P < 0 and ν1 + ν2 = r⋆.
We calculate the tax multiplier for non-traded output by diﬀerentiating the short-run static
solution for Y N/  evaluated at the steady-state:
˜ P
 





K d ˜ K





























σC ˜ CN − σL˜ LkTν2˜ Λ
  
Φdτj > 0, (168)
where we used the fact that Y N
K =  ν2 > 0 and Y N
L = −˜ kT ν2 < 0.
kT > kN
We calculate the tax multiplier for traded output by diﬀerentiating the short-run static solution
for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:




























(1 − αC) ˜ WF + r⋆ ˜ P˜ kN
 
Φj,kdτj > 0, j = F,H, (169)
where Υj > 0 and Φj,k > 0 (as long as ˜ A > 0. We used the fact that Y T
L = − ˜ Pν2˜ kN < 0,
Y T
K = ˜ Pν2 > 0,
 





˜ P < 0 and ν1 + ν2 = r⋆ to get (169).
69We calculate the tax multiplier for non-traded output by diﬀerentiating the short-run static
solution for Y N/  evaluated at the steady-state:
˜ P
 

































ΥjσC ˜ CN ˜ WFΦj,kdτj > 0, j = F,H, (170)
where we used the fact that Y N
K =  ν1 < 0 and Y N
L = −˜ kT ν1 > 0 to get (170).
Short-Run Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L,P), using the fact that the capital
































˜ Pν1˜ kN d˜ L






dτj ≷ 0, (171)
where we used the fact that Y T
L = − ˜ Pν1˜ kN > 0; we denoted by a hat the partial derivative of Y T
w. r. t. P for given labor, i. e. ˆ Y T
P < 0, and we used the fact that Y T
L LP + ˆ Y T
P = Y T
P . The short-run
tax multiplier for traded output is the result of two opposite eﬀects: while the initial stimulus of
labor supply induces a labor inﬂow in the traded sector, the real exchange appreciation shifts away
resources from the traded sector towards the non-traded sector.
Diﬀerentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L,P) and remembering that the capital






























dτj ≷ 0, (172)
where we used the fact that Y N
L = −˜ kT ν2 < 0, and we denoted by a hat the partial derivative of
Y N w. r. t. P for given labor, i. e. ˆ Y N
P > 0. The short-run tax multiplier for non-traded output is
the result of two opposite eﬀects: while the initial stimulus of labor supply induces a labor outﬂow
from the non-traded sector, the real exchange appreciation attracts resources in this sector.
kT > kN
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L,P), using the fact that the capital














where we used the fact that Y T
L = − ˜ Pν2˜ kN < 0,
Diﬀerentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L,p) and remembering that the capital
















   j,k
> 0, (174)
where we used the fact that Y N
L = −˜ kT ν1 > 0.
L Derivation of Formal Solutions after Anticipated Tax Re-
forms
In this section, we provide the main steps to derive formal solutions for key variables after future
anticipated permanent tax shocks, by applying the procedure developed by Schubert and Turnovsky
[2002]. For simplicity purpose, we assume that δK = 0 to avoid uninteresting complications.
L.1 Steady-State
As in Schubert and Turnovsky [2002], we deﬁne a viable steady-state i starting at time Ti to be one
that is consistent with long run solvency, given the stocks of capital, KTi and foreign bonds, BTi.


















¯ λi, ˜ Pi,τC
i
 
− GN = 0, (175b)
r⋆ ˜ Bi + Y T
 






¯ λi, ˜ Pi,τC
i
 
− GT = 0, (175c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition
 








The new consistent procedure consists in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, we solve the system (175a)-




i , and the markup  i.
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth ¯ λi and tax rates, τC, τF, τH and  
determine the following steady-state values:
˜ Pi = P ( i), (176a)














where partial derivatives are given by (118), (119), (120), (121) and (122). Note that as long as the
markup is ﬁxed, i.e., the number of competitors is large, then the relative price of non-tradables
remains unaﬀected after a tax change.
The second step consists in determining the equilibrium change of ¯ λ by taking the total
diﬀerential of the intertemporal solvency condition (175d):
[B¯ λ − Φ1Kλ]d¯ λi = dBTi − Φ1dKTi − [Bτj − Φ1Kτj]dτj
−[BτC − Φ1KτC]dτC (177)
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of ¯ λ as a function of tax rates:





























[B¯ λ − Φ1K¯ λ]
< 0, (179d)
From (179), we obtain the following properties:
λB [B¯ λ − Φ1K¯ λ] = 1, (180a)
λB [Bτj − Φ1Kτj] = −λτj, (180b)
λB [BτC − Φ1KτC] = −λτC. (180c)
L.3 Procedure to Derive Solutions for Future Anticipated Tax Shocks
In this subsection, we derive formal solutions after a future anticipated permanent change in the
tax rate. In the text, we consider a cut in τF coordinated with a rise in τC so as to balance the
government budget. Hence, we restrict ourselves to such revenue-neutral tax reform; note that a fall
in τH yields very similar qualitative results. Importantly, while after an unanticipated permanent
tax reform, the long-run eﬀects are simply a scaled-down version of the steady-state changes after
a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a decline in lump-sum transfer Z, this result does no longer hold when
the tax reform is anticipated since only the wealth eﬀect is in eﬀect over the pre-implementation
period. Hence, we proceed as follows. We determine separately formal solutions after a labor tax
cut and a rise in consumption tax and then we consider a tax reform. We are able to derive impact
71and steady-state eﬀects only if kT > kN, and thereby we present analytical results only in this case.
With reversal capital intensities, the eﬀects of an anticipated tax reform shifting the tax burden
from labor (i.e. τF) to consumption are estimated numerically and shown in Table 2.
We assume that the small open economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, denoted by the
subscript i = 0:
























Period 1 (0 ≤ t < T )
We assume that at time t = 0 agents perfectly anticipate that the tax rate τj (τC) falls (rises)





























When the tax shock is in eﬀect, the economy follows unstable transitional paths:
K(t) = ˜ K1 + B1eν1t + B2eν2t, (182a)
P(t) = ˜ P1 + ω1
2B1eν1t + ω2
2B2eν2t, (182b)
B(t) = ˜ B1 +
  
B0 − ˜ B1
 




+Φ1B1eν1t + Φ2B2eν2t, (182c)
with the steady-state values ˜ K1 and ˜ B1 given by the following functions (set i = 1 into (176b)-
(176c)):
















where the marginal utility of wealth remains constant over periods 1 and 2 at level ¯ λ1 = ¯ λT = ¯ λ2 = ¯ λ
after its initial jump at time t = 0.
Period 2 (t ≥ T )
Once the tax rate reverts back to its initial level, the economy follows stable paths
K(t) = ˜ K2 + B′
1eν1t, (184a)
P(t) = ˜ P2 + ω1
2B′
1eν1t, (184b)
B(t) = ˜ B2 + Φ1B′
1eν1t, (184c)
with the steady-state values ˜ K2 and ˜ B2 given by the following functions (set i = 2 into (176b)-
(176c)):
















During the transition period 1, the economy accumulates (or decumulates) capital and foreign
assets. Since this period is unstable, it would lead the nation to violate its intertemporal budget
constraint. By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable and must satisfy
the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the zero-root problem requires
the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth to adjust once-and-for-all when the shock hits
the economy. So λ remains constant over the periods 1 and 2. The aim of the two-step method is
to calculate the deviation of λ such that the country satisﬁes one single and overall intertemporal
budget constraint, given the new relevant initial conditions, KT and BT , accumulated over the
unstable period (before the shock in in eﬀect). Therefore, for the country to remain intertemporally
solvent, we require:
BT − ˜ B2 = Φ1
 
KT − ˜ K2
 
. (186)
In order to determine the three constants B1, B2, and B′
1, and the equilibrium value of marginal
utility of wealth, we impose three conditions:
1. Initial conditions K(0) = K0, B(0) = B0 must be met.
2. Economic aggregates K and P remain continuous at time T .
723. The intertemporal solvency constraint (186) must hold implying that the net foreign assets
remain continuous at time T .
Set t = 0 in solution (182a); evaluate at time t = T and equate (182a) and (184a), (182c) and
(184c):
˜ K1 + B1 + B2 = K0, (187a)
˜ K1 + B1eν1T + B2eν2T = ˜ K2 + B′
1eν1T , (187b)
˜ P1 + ω1
2B1eν1T + ω2
2B2eν2T = ˜ P2 + ω1
2B′
1eν1T , (187c)
where we used the continuity condition.
Evaluating KT and BT by using (182a) and (182c), substituting into (182c) evaluated at time
t = T , and using functions of steady-state values ˜ Ki and ˜ Bi given by (176) for appropriate periods,




















































Then, we approximate the steady-state changes with the diﬀerentials:


























   
fut
, (189a)














= Kτjdτj + KτCdτC, (189b)

















   
   
fut
dτF + B¯ λ
d¯ λ
dτC
   
   
fut
dτC, (189c)














= Bτjdτj + BτCdτC. (189d)
By substituting these expressions into (187) and (188), we obtain ﬁnally
B1 + B2 = −K¯ λd¯ λ, (190a)
B1eν1T + B2eν2T − B′





1eν1T = 0, (190c)
where d¯ λ ≡ ¯ λ − λ0 and
B1Υ1 + B2Υ2 + B¯ λd¯ λ = −Ωj − ΩC, (191)
where we set
Υ1 ≡ Φ1, (192a)
Υ2 ≡ Φ2 + (Φ1 − Φ2)e−ν1T , (192b)
Ωj ≡ (Bτj − Φ1Kτj)e−r
⋆T dτj, (192c)
ΩC ≡ (BτC − Φ1KτC)e−r
⋆T dτC. (192d)
We solve the system written in a matrix form for the constants B1, B2, B′
1, and the change in





Φ1 Υ2 0 B¯ λ
1 1 0 K¯ λ


































where the determinant E is:







⋆T > 0, (194)
L.4 Formal Solutions for an Anticipated Change in τF
In deriving the formal solutions for an anticipated labor tax cut at time T , we keep unchanged τC
so that dτC = 0 and dτj = dτF < 0 since we consider a decline in payroll taxes.
Case kT > kN
73Remembering that ω1
2 = 0 in this case, solving (190)-(191) gives:





σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
 
λτFe−r
⋆T dτF > 0, (195a)
B2 = 0, (195b)
B′








⋆T > 0, (195d)
where λτF > 0 represents the change in the equilibrium of the marginal utility of wealth following
an unexpected permanent labor tax cut; we used property (180b) to get (200c).
Case kN > kT
Remembering that ω2
2 = 0 in this case, solving (190)-(191) gives:




   
 
fut
dτF − KτFe− 2T dτF > 0, (196a)
B2 = KτFe− 2T dτF > 0, (196b)
B′
1 = B1 > 0, (196c)













KτF > 0, (197)
with λB < 0 and









We determine the impacts of an anticipated labor tax cut by assuming that kT > kN since when
kN > kT, we are unable to determine the signs of expressions as the change in the marginal utility
of wealth given by (197) complicates substantially algebra.
Note that numerical results reported in Table 2 show that the long-run eﬀects are similar whether
kT ≷ kN. Denoting by X the macroeconomic aggregate C,L,K,NX, and using the fact that
˜ X = X
 ¯ λ,τj,τC 
















Applying this formula to consumption, labor and capital stock, the long-run eﬀects expressed in
percentage deviations from initial steady-state (denoted by a hat) are:
ˆ ˜ C
   
fut = −σCΛF ˜ ξe−r
⋆T ˆ τF > 0, (200a)
ˆ ˜ L
   
fut = −σLΛF
 
1 − ˜ ξe−r
⋆T
 
ˆ τF > 0, (200b)
d ˜ K














ˆ τF > 0, (200c)
where ˆ τF < 0, 0 < ΛF < 1 (see (108b)) 0 < ˜ ξ < 1 (see (108c)). The sign of eq. (200c) comes from
the fact that the wealth eﬀect is smaller than after an unexpected labor tax cut (see eq. (111)).
Impact Eﬀects
Diﬀerentiating eq. (184a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, we obtain the initial response




fut = ν1B1 + ν2B2.








σC ˜ CNσL˜ L˜ kTν1
  σL ˜ W ˜ L
 
σCPC ˜ C + σL ˜ WF ˜ L
 ΛFe−r
⋆T ˆ τF < 0,
=
 
σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
 
˜ ξΛFe−r
⋆T ˆ τF < 0. (201)
74The general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:
B(t) = ˜ B +
  
B0 − ˜ B
 
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
 
er
⋆t + Φ1B1eν1t + Φ2B2eν2t. (202)
Diﬀerentiating eq. (202) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, and remembering that B2 = 0, we
obtain the initial response of the current account following a future anticipated permanent change
in the tax rate:
CA(0)
   
fut = r⋆
  
B0 − ˜ B1
 
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
 
+ ν1Φ1B1 + ν2Φ2B2.
We compute:
−d ˜ B1
   
fut − Φ1B1
= −(B¯ λ − Φ1K¯ λ)d¯ λ






⋆T dτF = (BτF − Φ1KτF)e−r
⋆T dτF,
=
σL ˜ WF ˜ L
r⋆ e−r
⋆T ˆ τF, (203)
where we used the fact that ˜ f − ˜ Pr⋆fk = ˜ WF, B2 = 0 and property (180b). The initial reaction of
the current account becomes:
CA(0)
   
fut = σL ˜ W ˜ Le−r
⋆T ˆ τF − ν1 ˜ PB1,





σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
 
 




⋆T ˆ τF ≷ 0, (204)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = − ˜ P.
L.5 Formal Solutions for an Anticipated Change in τC
In deriving the formal solutions for an anticipated rise in the consumption tax at time T , we keep
unchanged τF so that dτF = 0 and consider dτC > 0.
Case kT > kN
Remembering that ω1
2 = 0 in this case, solving (190)-(191) gives:





σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
 
λτCe−r
⋆T dτC < 0, (205a)
B2 = 0, (205b)
B′








⋆T < 0, (205d)
where λτC < 0 represents the change in the equilibrium of the marginal utility of wealth following
an unexpected permanent labor tax cut; we used property (180b) to get (205d).
Case kN > kT
Remembering that ω2
2 = 0 in this case, solving (190)-(191) gives:




   
 
fut
dτC − KτCe− 2T dτC > 0, (206a)
B2 = KτCe− 2T dτC > 0, (206b)
B′
1 = B1 > 0, (206c)
where the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth:
d¯ λ
dτC
   
   
fut
= λτCe−r





KτC < 0, (207)
with λB < 0 and (Φ1 − Φ2) given by (201).
Long-Run Eﬀects
We determine the eﬀects of an anticipated labor tax cut by assuming that kT > kN since when
kN > kT, we are unable to determine the signs of formal expressions as the change in the marginal
utility of wealth given by (207) complicates substantially algebra.
75Applying formula (199) to consumption, labor and capital stock, the long-run eﬀects expressed













ˆ τC < 0, (208a)
ˆ ˜ L
   
fut = −σL
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
e−r
















+ σL˜ L˜ kT
 





ˆ τC < 0, (208c)
where ˆ τC > 0, 0 < ΛF < 1 (see (108b)) 0 < ˜ ξ < 1 (see (108c)). The sign of eq. (208c) comes from
the fact that the wealth eﬀect is smaller than after an unexpected labor tax cut (see eq. (102d)).
Impact Eﬀects
Diﬀerentiating eq. (184a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, we obtain the initial response




fut = ν1B1 + ν2B2.








σC ˜ CNσL˜ L˜ kTν1
  σCPC ˜ C
 
σCPC ˜ C + σL ˜ WF ˜ L
 e−r
⋆T ˆ τC < 0,
= −
 
σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
  
1 − ˜ ξ
 
e−r
⋆T ˆ τC < 0. (209)
Diﬀerentiating eq. (202) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, and remembering that B2 = 0, we
obtain the initial response of the current account following a future anticipated permanent change
in the tax rate:
CA(0)
   
fut = r⋆
  
B0 − ˜ B1
 
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
 
+ ν1B1Φ1 + ν2B2Φ2.
We compute:
−d ˜ B1
   
fut − Φ1B1
= −(B¯ λ − Φ1K¯ λ)d¯ λ











⋆T ˆ τC, (210)
where we used the fact that B2 = 0 and property (180b). The initial reaction of the current account
becomes:
CA(0)
   
fut = −σCPC ˜ Ce−r
⋆T ˆ τC − ν1 ˜ PB1,





σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
 
 




⋆T ˆ τC ≷ 0, (211)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = − ˜ P.
L.6 Formal Solutions for an Anticipated Tax Reform
We now derive the steady-state and impact eﬀects of a tax reform which involves cutting payroll
taxes and raising consumption taxes so as to keep the government budget balanced. We denote the
superscript |F,C the eﬀects of such a tax reform.
Steady-State Changes
Using (200c) and (205d), the change in the marginal utility of wealth after an anticipated tax
reform is given by:
ˆ ¯ λ








   




˜ ξΛF ˆ τF −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 




⋆T < 0. (212)
76Eq. (212) corresponds to eq. (32) in the text.




































ΓC   
fut = PC ˜ C
 

























Comparing ΓF after an unanticipated and anticipated tax reforms, we ﬁnd that:












Comparing ΓC after an unanticipated and anticipated tax reforms, we ﬁnd that:












We ﬁnd numerically that the change in the consumption tax (see Panel B of Table 2) so as to balance
the government budget after an anticipated tax reform is roughly equal to that after an unanticipated
tax reform (see Panel B of Table 1). Hence, the consumption tax must increase for a given labor
tax cut. However, we are no longer able to express steady-state changes after an anticipated tax
reform as scaled-down versions of the steady-state eﬀects after a labor tax cut ﬁnanced by a decline
in lump-sum transfer. We compute below steady-state eﬀects after an anticipated tax reform.
Using (200) and (208), the long-run eﬀects of an anticipated tax reform, expressed in percentage
deviations from initial steady-state (denoted by a hat), are:
ˆ ˜ C











ˆ τC ˆ τC   F,C
fut,
= −σCΛF ˜ ξe−r









ˆ τC   F,C
fut > 0, (218a)
ˆ ˜ L















1 − ˜ ξe−r
⋆T
 
ˆ τF − σL
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
e−r
⋆T ˆ τC   F,C




fut = K¯ λd¯ λ
 
 F,C

















fut > 0, (218c)
where ˆ τF < 0, ˆ τC   F,C
fut > 0 (see (213)), 0 < ΛF < 1 (see (108b)) 0 < ˜ ξ < 1 (see (108c)). To derive
eq. (218c), we totally diﬀerentiated eq. (176b). Eq. (218b) corresponds to eq. (33) in the text.
Eq. (218c) corresponds to eq. (34) in the text.
Combining (218b) and (218c) yields the long-run change in GDP following an anticipated
revenue-neutral tax reform:
ˆ ˜ Y
   F,C
fut =
 
1 − ˜ βL
 
ˆ ˜ K
   F,C
fut + ˜ βL
ˆ ˜ L
   F,C
fut > 0. (219)
Eq. (219) corresponds to eq. (35) in the text.
Impact Eﬀects
Combining (201) and (209), the initial response of investment after an anticipated revenue-
neutral tax reform is unambiguously negative. Formally, it is given by:
I(0)
   F,C
fut =
 
σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
  
˜ ξΛF ˆ τF −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 
e−r




⋆T < 0, (220)
 
σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
 
> 0, ˆ τF < 0, ˆ τC   F,C
fut > 0. Eq. (220) corresponds to eq. (36) in the text.
77Combining (204) and (211), the initial response of the current account after an anticipated
revenue-neutral tax reform is unambiguously positive. Formally, it is given by:
CA(0)
   F,C
fut =
 







σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν1
  
˜ ξΛF ˆ τF −
 
1 − ˜ ξ
 




⋆T ≷ 0, (221)
Eq. (221) corresponds to eq. (37) in the text.
M Welfare Analysis
In this section, we investigate analytically the welfare eﬀects of an unanticipated tax reform which
involves simultaneously cutting the labor tax by dτj < 0 (j = F,H) and raising the consumption
tax or the progressive wage taxes by dτk > 0 (k = c,H). We denote by φ(t) the instantaneous
utility at time t:
φ(t) = u(C(t)) + v (L(t)), (222)






We ﬁrst linearize the instantaneous utility function (222) in the neighborhood of the steady-state:








L(t) − ˜ L
 
, (224)
with ˜ φ given by









By substituting solutions for C(t) and L(t), we obtain the stable solution for instantaneous
welfare:
φ(t) = ˜ φ + [uCCP + vLLP]ω1
2
 
K0 − ˜ K
 
eν1t, (226)









We estimate the expression in square brackets by making use of the ﬁrst-order conditions for con-
sumption and labor supply supply decisions evaluated at the steady-state, i. e. uC = PC¯ λ
 
1 + τC 
and vL = −¯ λ ˜ WA. We obtain:
uCCP + vLLP = ¯ λ

−σC ˜ CN  
1 + τC 
+
˜ WA




˜ kN − ˜ kT
 

 ≷ 0. (227)
Evaluate (222) at the steady-state and diﬀerentiate allows us to derive the long-run change of
φ after a tax reform:
d˜ φ









dτj ≷ 0, (228)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1.
































where we used (228) to get (229).
Case kN > kT
If the non-traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector, the long-run change of
φ after a tax reform is:
d˜ φ


































78where 0 < Φj,k < 1 and Γj > 0. We substituted uC = PC¯ λ
 
1 + τC 
and vL = −¯ λ ˜ WA, and we used














σC ˜ CN − σL˜ L˜ kTν2˜ Λ
 
σC ˜ CN to determine (230). Since
the sign of the long-run change of instantaneous utility is ambiguous, we dot not calculate the initial
reaction of φ which in particular depends on eq. (230).
Case kT > kN
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, the long-run change of















dτj dτj > 0, (231)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1. We substituted uC = PC¯ λ
 
1 + τC 





dτj to determine (231).
M.2 Overall Welfare
Until now, we have analyzed the instantaneous welfare implications of an unanticipated permanent
tax reform, say at diﬀerent points of times. To address welfare eﬀects in a convenient way within
an intertemporal-maximizing framework, we have to evaluate the discounted value of (222) over
the agent’s inﬁnite planning horizon. Whereas the change of overall welfare can be estimated
numerically, we determine its measure along a transitional path after a tax restructuring.
In order to have a correct and comprehensive measure of welfare, we calculate ﬁrst the discounted













φ(0) − ˜ φ
r⋆ − ν1
. (232)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand-side of (232) represents the capitalized value of instantaneous
welfare evaluated at the steady-state. The second term on the RHS of (232) vanishes whenever
the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector since the dynamics of the
real exchange degenerate. If consumption reacts strongly on impact and labor is not too much
responsive, then φ(0) can overshoot its long-run level which exerts a positive inﬂuence on overall
welfare.
Case kN > kT
If the non-traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector, the long-run change of
U after a tax reform is:
dU






















































































σL˜ L˜ kT ˜ Λ
 





Case kT > kN
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, the long-run change of














> 0 is given by (231).
79N The Case of Endogenous Markup
The framework builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]. While we consider the case of an endoge-
nous markup, it holds for an exogenous markup, though in the latter case the number of competitors
is large enough so that the price-elasticity of demand is not aﬀected by ﬁrm entry. There are two
sectors in the economy: a perfectly competitive sector which produces a traded good denoted by
the superscript T and an imperfectly competitive sector which produces a non-traded good denoted
by the superscript N. We assume that each producer of a unique variety of the non-traded good
has the following technology XN
j = H (Kj,Lj) with Kj the capital stock and Lj labor.
N.1 Framework
The ﬁnal non-traded output, Y N, is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-
returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral non
traded goods:
Y N =










where ω > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two diﬀerent sectoral goods and QN
j
stands for intermediate consumption of sector’j variety (with j ∈ [0,N]). The ﬁnal good producers
behave competitively, and the households use the ﬁnal good for both consumption and investment.
In each of the j sectors, there are N > 1 ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated goods that are aggregated

















i,j stands for output of ﬁrm i in sector j and ǫ is the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties.
Denoting by P and Pj the relative price of the ﬁnal good and of the jth variety of the intermediate
good, respectively, the proﬁt of the ﬁnal good producer is:
ΠN = p























and the price of the ﬁnal output is given by:
P =








where Pj is the price index of sector j and p is the price of the ﬁnal good.
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each ﬁrm that produces one variety X N
i,j
is a price setter. Intermediate output X N
i,j is produced using capital KN










Denoting by Pi,j the price of good i in sector j, the proﬁt function for the jth sector good




















The demand faced by each producer X N










51By having the term N
− 1
ǫ−1 in (237), the analysis abstracts from the variety eﬀect and concentrates
solely on the eﬀects of markup variation.












Combining (239) and (241), the demand for variety X N
i,j can be expressed in terms of the relative






 −ǫ  
Pj
p
 −ω Y N
N
. (245)
In order to operate, each intermediate good producer must pay a ﬁxed cost denoted by FC
measured in terms of the ﬁnal good which is assumed to be symmetric across ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm j












j − pFC. (246)
The demands for capital and hours worked are given by the equalities of the markup-adjusted
marginal revenues of capital
PjHK
  and labor
PjHL
  , to the capital rental rate RK and the producer
wage WF, respectively.
N.2 First-Order Conditions
























j stands for the demand for variety j; ﬁrm j chooses its price ̺j to maximize proﬁts treating
the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for the non traded sector write as follows:
PjHK + ηHK = RK, , (248a)



























We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms in the intermediate good sector produce
the output level X N
i,j = X N with the same quantities of labor LN
i,j = LN and capital KN
i,j = KN.
Hence, the aggregate stock of physical capital and hours worked are KN = NKN and LN = NLN,
respectively. They also set the same price Pi,j = P. Hence, eq. (240) and eq. (244) imply that
P = P.
Deﬁning the markup   as e








We follow Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] by taking into account
the inﬂuence of the individual price on the sectoral price index:
e(N) = ǫ −
(ǫ − ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞). (251)
As will be useful later, we calculate expressions of the partial derivatives of the price-elasticity


















where we let   = e
e−1.
81We further assume that free entry drives proﬁts down to zero in each nindustry at each instant
of time. Using constant returns to scale in production, i. e. X = H (K,L) = HKK +HLL, and the




− RKKN − WFLN − PNFC = 0. (253)
Substituting the short-run static solution for non traded output (51), the zero-proﬁt condition (253)
can be rewritten as:
Y N  







N.3 Short-Run Static Solution for the Number of Firms
The zero proﬁt condition (254) can be solved for the number of producers in the non traded sector:
N = N
 
K,P, ¯ λ,τF,τH 
, (255)









where X = K,P, ¯ λ,τF,τH, ωFC ≡ NFC/Y N stands for the share of ﬁxed costs in markup adjusted






ηY N,  (  − 1) + 1





Inspection of (257) shows that χ < 0 if η ,N is not too large. This implies that an input inﬂow in
the non traded sector that raises Y N and thereby yields to proﬁt opportunities stimulates entry of
ﬁrms.
N.4 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions for non traded output and consumption, given by (51) and (43)
respectively, into the non traded good market-clearing condition (57a), and inserting the short-
run static solution for sectoral the capital-labor ratio in the non traded good sector (45) into the
dynamic equation for the real exchange rate (57b), and substituting the short-run static solution
for the number of ﬁrms (255) yields:
˙ K =
Y N {K,P, [N (K,P)]}
 [N (K,p)]
− CN (P) − δKK − GN, (258a)
˙ P = P
 
r⋆ + δK −
hk
 





For clarity purposes, we dropped variables which are constant over time as arguments of short-run
static solutions.
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting by ˜ x = ˜ K, ˜ P the steady-
state values of x = K,P, we obtain in a matrix form:
 




K(t) − ˜ K,P(t) − ˜ P
 T
, (259)













































































The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is unambiguously negative:


























































and the trace is given by:


















































  = r⋆ + δK; the positive sign follows from NK > 0 and
 N < 0.








2 − 4Det J
 
≷ 0, i = 1,2. (264)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r⋆ < ν2. (265)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium yields a
unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
General solutions are those described by (67) with eigenvector ωi







Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
Substituting ﬁrst the short-run static solution for consumption in the traded good (43) and the
short-run static solution for traded output (51) into the accumulation equation of traded bonds
(13), and linearizing around the steady-state gives:
˙ B(t) = r⋆
 





K + Y T
   NNK
  





P + Y T










P is given by (44b).
Using the fact that P(t) − ˜ P = ω1
2
 






K + Y T





P + Y T







solving for the diﬀerential equation and invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal
solvency, the stable solution for net foreign assets ﬁnally reduces to:
B(t) − ˜ B = Φ1
 
K(t) − ˜ K
 
, (269)
and the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint is:
˜ B − B0 = Φ1
 
˜ K − K0
 
, (270)
where we substituted B1 ≡ K0 − ˜ K.
N.5 Stable Solutions for L, N, and W
Linearizing the short-run static solution N = N (K,P) gives the stable solution for the number of
ﬁrms:
N(t) = ˜ N + NK
 




P(t) − ˜ P
 
,





K(t) − ˜ K
 
. (271)
83Evaluating at time t = 0 and diﬀerentiating gives the initial response of the number of ﬁrms :





d ˜ K|j,k. (272)
Linearizing the short-run static solution for labor L = L(P, ), using the fact that   =  (N),
and substituting the appropriate solutions, the solution for L(t) reads:
L(t) = ˜ L + LP
 
P(t) − ˜ P
 
+ L  ( (t) − ˜  ), (273)












(K(t) − ˜ K), (274)
where we used the fact that L  = −
LPp
  . Evaluating at time t = 0 and diﬀerentiating yields the
initial response of employment:












d ˜ Kj,k. (275)
Linearizing the short-run static solution for the wage rate W = W (P, ) and substituting
appropriate solutions gives:
W(t) = ˜ W + WPω1
2
 
K(t) − ˜ K
 
+ w  N
 
N(t) − ˜ N
 
,












(K(t) − ˜ K), (276)
where we used the fact that W  = −WPP
  . Evaluating at time t = 0 and diﬀerentiating gives the
initial response of the wage rate:












d ˜ Kj,k. (277)
N.6 Tax Multiplier for Overall Output
Long-Run Tax Multiplier
Because overall output denoted by Y is the sum of traded output Y T and non-traded output
measured in terms of the traded good P
 Y N, using the fact that Y T ≡ Y T (K,L,P, ) and Y N ≡
Y N (K,L,P, ), remembering that a tax reform exerts a long-term eﬀect on the relative price of non
tradables, the steady-state change of overall output becomes:
d˜ Y






















   j,k
,
= ˜ Pr⋆d ˜ K
   j,k
+ WFd˜ L
   j,k
> 0. (278)
where we used properties (54b) and (54c) to get (165); according to property (54a), denoting by a
hat the partial derivative of Y w. r. t. P for given labor, ˆ Y T
P + P
  ˆ Y N
P = ˆ Y T
  + P
  ˆ Y N
  = 0.




CN(t)+GN +I(t), the overall output is equal to Y (t) = PC (P(t))C(t)+GT +P(t)+GN +NX(t)+










+ PCd ˜ C
 
 j,k
+ d ˜ NX
 
 j,k




where d ˜ NX
   j,k
= −r⋆d ˜ B
   j,k
and d˜ I
   j,k
= δKd ˜ K
   j,k
.
Initial Tax Multiplier











































   j,k
> 0, (280)
where we used properties (54c) to get (166); according to property (54a), denoting by a hat the
partial derivative of Y w. r. t. P for given labor, ˆ Y T
P + P
  ˆ Y N
P = ˆ Y T
  + P
  ˆ Y N
  = 0.
84Linearizing around the steady-state yields:












I(t) − ˜ I
 
.
Evaluating at time t = 0 and diﬀerentiating yields the initial reaction of GDP:
dY (0)





   j,k
+ PCdC(0)
   j,k
+ dNX(0)
   j,k
+ dI(0)
   j,k
, (281)
where dC(0)
   j,k
= d ˜ C
   j,k
− CPω1
2d ˜ K
   j,k
, dP(0)
   j,k
= d ˜ P
   j,k
− ω1
2d ˜ K
   j,k
, dI(0) = − 1d ˜ K












N.7 Tax Multipliers for Sectoral Outputs
Long-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
We calculate the tax multiplier for traded output by diﬀerentiating the short-run static solution
for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:










+ ˆ Y T
P d ˜ P
 
 j,k
+ ˆ Y T




where ˆ Y T
P < 0, ˆ Y T
  > 0 and  N < 0.
Using the fact that Y T(t) = CT +GT +NX(t) and totally diﬀerentiating yields the steady-state
change of traded output following a tax reform:
d˜ Y T 
 j,k
= d ˜ CT 
 j,k




where d ˜ NX
   j,k
= −r⋆d ˜ B
   j,k
.
We calculate the tax multiplier for non-traded output by diﬀerentiating the short-run static
solution for Y N/  evaluated at the steady-state:
˜ P
 































where ˆ Y N
P > 0, ˆ Y T
  < 0 and  N < 0.
Using the fact that
Y
N(t)
  = CN(t)+GN +I(t), and totally diﬀerentiating gives the steady-state
change of non-traded output following a tax reform:
1
˜  
d˜ Y N 
 j,k







   j,k
= δKd ˜ K
   j,k
.
Short-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L,P, ), using the fact that the capital












+ ˆ Y T





   j,k
and dN(0)
   j,k
are given by (272) and (275), respectively, and dP(0)
   j,k
= d ˜ P




   j,k
.
Linearizing Y T(t) = CT + GT + NX(t) around the steady-state, evaluating at time t = 0 and
totally diﬀerentiating yields the initial change of traded output following a tax reform:
dY T(0)
   j,k
= dCT(0)
   j,k
+ dNX(0)




















Diﬀerentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L,P, ) and remembering that the cap-






























   j,k
and dN(0)
   j,k
are given by (272) and (275), respectively, and dP(0)
   j,k
= d ˜ P










  = CN(t) + GN + I(t), around the steady-state, evaluating at time t = 0 and
totally diﬀerentiating gives the initial change of non-traded output following a tax reform:
1
˜  
d˜ Y N   j,k
= dCN(0)
   j,k
+ dI(0)
   j,k
, (289)
where dCN(0)




   j,k
and dI(0) = − 1d ˜ K
   j,k
.
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